The press seem to be touting Rad-Alt failure as the primary reason for this crash..... when it was only a contributory factor. As a Training Captain you have to be capable of doing it all yourself under the arduous condition of actually having someone next to you who is working against you. (It would be easier for the RHS to be empty!)
For whatever reason the approach becomes rushed - I can understand that with the enthusiasm of the Schipol controllers together with such low ILS platform altitudes that can very easily happen.... Anyway the approach is rushed, the Training Captain becomes overloaded, maybe he takes the thrust into his scan at some stage but it is at idle- just where he wants it during a rushed approach.
They continue down the slope- maybe he noticed the RA1 was reading rubbish but they're not Autolanding off this so it should be no big deal. At some stage it all comes together and he sits back and breathes a sigh of relief - he has averted yet another GA from a rushed approach. Unfortunately the thrust is at idle - maybe obvious from the FMA, maybe not.
Whichever way it happened the approach never became stable and should have been thrown away long before the stall warning sounded.
Why did the TC not intervene earlier? I have sat and watched my more inexperienced colleagues make their mistakes in the RHS, some of them have been enough to give a lesser mortal an apoplexy. Perhaps the TC was incapacitated ?
Yes they should have picked it up, but this is not a classic 737 it's a new NG....
What sort of modern airliner design permits a single benign failure of an autoflight system to send the aircraft towards a fatal stall if not picked up?
Nice one Boeing.