He also mentions that the Sea Harrier got 23 confirmed air to air kills in 1982, which was doing well considering the lack of AEW or AAR support, the limited weapon load, and the limitations of Blue Fox radar.
The author of such an article would do well to add a simple paragraph to place this comment in context. Otherwise, the casual reader is led to believe Blue Fox was somehow lacking in capability whereas to this day most of the worlds airforces would give their right arm for it.
The truth is that in late 1981 the MoD was undertaking 3 major airborne radar programmes, for Sea Harrier, Lynx and Sea King. (Blue Fox, Sea Spray and Sea Searcher). Only Sea Spray was reasonably mature. Development of the other two had to be cut short by a year and production launched. That so much kit made it South is testament to the flexibility of both companies – neither of which exist anymore. What the SHAR force got first was “B” Models – i.e. pre-production models. They lacked features from the intended specification, yet the basic quality and performance was so good Ferranti didn’t see them again for upwards of 8 years. The down side was that pilots noticed marked differences between aircraft – they should have been withdrawn as soon as possible but there is always a tendency for the Services to hang on to what they have.
While a simplification, largely because of this Blue Fox effectively became a Technology Demonstrator Programme for Blue Vixen and ECR90 (Typhoon’s radar). “B” Model Blue Vixen could be seen working in about 86 – meaning the requirement had been approved some years earlier (judging by the NSR number, maybe even during 82). It is a feature of these programmes, plus Merlin/Blue Kestrel, that the avionics were available many years before actually being put to use. For example, Merlin needed an avionic upgrade before she entered service (still waiting I think). This says something about the procurement methodology and planning, but I won’t go there.