The original thread seems to have been locked without explanation, so I had to start a new one.
There's an excellent comment piece in today's Guardian exposing the nonsense of the liquids ban (or, rather, the way in which it is implemented).
Full article here.
Some short extracts:
If you're caught at airport security with a bomb or a gun, the screeners aren't just going to take them away from you. They're going to call the police... No terrorist is going to base his plot on getting a gun through airport security if there's a decent chance of getting caught, because the consequences of getting caught are too severe.
Contrast that with a terrorist plot that requires a 12-oz bottle of liquid. If some terrorists try to bring their liquid bomb through airport security and the screeners catch them - like they caught me with my opaque bottle labelled as "saline" - the terrorists can simply try again. In fact, they can try again and again. They can keep trying until they succeed. Because there are no consequences to trying and failing, the screeners have to be 100% effective. Even if the screeners slip up only once every hundred times, the plot can succeed...
Those in charge of airport security need to make a choice: either a 4oz bottle of saline is a potential bomb, or it isn't. If it is dangerous, treat is as dangerous and treat anyone who tries to bring one on as potentially dangerous. If it's not dangerous, stop prohibiting it from being taken onto airplanes