The crew of the AA DC-10 at Chicago did not know that they had a 3 foot crack in the pylon of No.1 engine (caused by very dubious maintenance procedures) at V1.
The crew of the AA DC-10 at Chicago did not know that they had a 3 foot crack in the pylon of No.1 engine (caused by very dubious maintenance procedures) after V1.
The crew of the AA DC-10 at Chicago did not know that they had a 3 foot crack in the pylon of No.1 engine (caused by very dubious maintenance procedures) even when the engine and the pylon departed the aircraft and took the left wing slats with them.
Therefore, the TORA at Chicago was completely irrelevant to any decision process that the crew could possibly have made.
I flew the DC-10 for 8 years and it was not a great "stopping" aeroplane but it was a great "going" aeroplane. A lot of people were killed by decisions to stop after V1.
If you need any convincing, try looking at the Spantax DC-10-30 disaster at Malaga. All they had was a burst tyre on take-off but a decision to shut the throttles AFTER V1 resulted in the inevitable overrun on to a motorway (if my memory serves me right).
Had they continued to get airborne, they had enough fuel to fly to Tierra del Fuego in Chile and book a bunch of taxis and hotels on the way.
Once you shut those throttles, you have no more options available.