S-H
“It is certainly my experience that these words are used by both industry and MoD as a get out”.
If I could clarify what I said, because I don’t think you’re actually disagreeing with me.
It is important to establish contractual boundaries of responsibility. On a whole aircraft, there are typically 3 components – MoD, the Aircraft Design Authority and Equipment / Sub-System Design Authorities/Custodians.
The words quoted are simply the standard way of expressing that boundary from the ADA or DA/DC viewpoint. It is not abrogation of responsibility or trying to “get out”, it is an indication of a deeper understanding which is almost entirely lost on the MoD.
Most companies are happy to accept responsibility but they must be paid a fair and reasonable price, under a suitable contract which clearly states their responsibilities and articulates the control boundaries. It is the responsibility of the MoD (and seldom as low as IPT level as they don’t control everything in their aircraft) to ensure there are no gaps at these control boundaries. In practice, this is usually a 2 Star.
Admittedly, some companies flagrantly abrogate their responsibility, even when contracted properly, but the PE/DPA Nimrod 2 Star, CDP and successive Mins(AF) said that was ok, so I’m sure it is. Hopefully the QC will disagree. This is a simple thing to fix.
The procedures for exercising such seamless control over a design, and maintaining that design, are laid down in a Def Stan which the MoD have been trying to scrap for 13 years. It has not been updated for 17 years (Jan 91) and has largely fallen into disuse. A “waste of money” apparently. And because it is not applied properly - here we go again – there are gaping holes in airworthiness audit trails. This is the point made here many times and in various BoI reports involving fatalities – the procedures/processes/regulations are relatively robust (although some are outdated) but they are not implemented properly. This is a DELIBERATE MoD decision, therefore Companies MUST protect themselves in a legal sense.
In short, companies have a vested interest in their product being seen to be safe. MoD policy and practice militate against this.
I’m sorry for the detail, which I know many here understand, but I feel it important to make these distinctions. Things are coming to a head and fingers will be pointed. Some already point them at BAeS. I have read the various official reports which are available and, very clearly, BAeS and vendors have not been under contract to ensure a seamless audit trail. Also, and the QC’s remit is worded this way, the term “RAF” is used when it should be “MoD” and even “Government”. Having read, for example, the main QinetiQ report mentioned here, there are a few things the RAF could have done better, but the underlying problems are central. There is a danger of a cheap and nasty “fix” for Nimrod but the same thing happening again on other aircraft. Nimrod is not the first, it’s the one that has brought matters to a head.