Francis Tusa's always entertaining, always thought provoking and often insightful Defence Analysis carried the following piece on Scotland....
Issues For The Sake Of Auld Lang Syne ...?
The topic hasn’t been an elephant in the living room. More like it, it is an elephant that has just burst through the wall intothe living room. And the pachyderm in question is that of Scottish independence. To many, it might seem strange that this is an issue of any real interest/importance to Defence Analysis at all. But once you start to look at it, the defence and the defence industrial implications of Scottish independence are, to put it mildly, eye-watering .... And after quite a lot of mulling and thought between Christmas parties (pass the liver salts Ethel) and the mince pies, Defence Analysis believes that it can say two things with conviction: firstly, independence would be very bad news for Scotland from a defence and defence industrial point of view; and secondly, although it might look like an unmitigated, expensive disaster from a London base, the options open are actually quite good ....
The topic of independence has come from next to nowhere over the past 2–3 months. Of course, there has been a Scottish Nationalist Party (SNP) for decades, and there have been referenda on the topic before now. And, sure, the matter of previous elements of devolution of powers to both Edinburgh and Cardiff had also added some fuel to the fire. But for most – and during the research of this article, it was as true for Scots as anyone else – the idea of Scottish independence has seemed another issue among many. It didn’t seem to be at the top of that many peoples’ lists.
But it is the up-coming elections for the Scottish Parliament in May 2007 that has suddenly raised the spectre that independence could actually be on the cards. Firstly ,there are signs that the governing party of the UK, the Labour Party, could yet see major losses in the May Scottish elections, perhaps even suffering a similar fate to that of the Conservatives over the past 10–15 years “North of the Border”.
At this stage – mid- December 2006 – the polls suggest that there won’t be an absolute SNP majority, and that the Nationalists are likely to have to enter a coalition with the Liberal Democrats. However, even in such a case, the pressure, according to the Scottish opinion polls, for independence is high, and at the time of writing – mid-December 2006 – the polls suggested that 50–60% of the Scottish electorate would support such a move.
On this basis alone, Defence Analysis is going to look, on a hypothetical basis, on what might happen in the aftermath of a referendum on independence at some date over the next five or so years.
Policy Number One, and at the top of the SNP defence policy list:
“The SNP reaffirms that no nuclear weapons will be based on independent Scottish soil. On Independence we will negotiate the safe removal of Trident from Scotland.”
OK, fair enough: that’s Faslane and Coulport for the chop right away! Without so much as a by-your-leave, the SNP is declaring that it has no wish to see these facilities, and one has to assume the nuclear submarines in Faslane, too, would not really be welcome. As a point of financial reference, the money that flows through the nuclear facilities at Coulport and Faslane amount to £200–250-million per year, and this does not take account of any local spend by service personnel. The departure of the nuclear deterrent force will deprive the local area of a welcome source of revenue.
WHAT SHAPE?
But what would the so-called Scottish Defence Services do as a set of roles and missions, and so what would it look like? Once again, it is probably only fair to look at the small details held in the SNP’s policy document, and try to extrapolate from that ....
“Our armed forces will initially be equipped with Scotland’s share of UK defence resources.”
So how will you calculate the “share” of the UK’s defence resources?
● Population. Well, if you were to assess matters on the size of Scotland in population terms relevant to the UK as a whole, then Scotland might be hopeful of getting 5–6% of the total.
● GDP. Depending upon the figures, and the fact that even within a “united” government, there seem to be so many different ways of calculating things, Scotland has somewhere between 8% and 10% of the UK’s total GDP.
● Tax Take. Another figure which can, in all honesty, be read in a number of ways. Defence Analysis has seen Scottish Independence figures from 4% to 7% for the share of taxes collected in the UK that come from Scotland.
Defence Analysis isn’t going to get into the nitty-gritty of exactly, down to the last decimal place, the size of Scotland’s share of the UK economy. But an upper limit of 10% is, on the basis of all readily available, independent figures, fair, and a good basis to start work on.
So where does one go from here? Well, let us put some maxima and minima on what the various percentages of the above calculations would provide as regards the Royal Navy and RAF:
DA then runs a table with assets and Scotland’s max and minimum shares – including between 0.4 and 1 SSNs, 6 and 14.5 GR4s, 3 and 7 Harriers, 9 and 23 Typhoons, 1.5 and 3.6 Hercs, 0.5 and 1.2 Nimrods, 1.6 and 4 Chinooks, and 1 and 2.5 Merlins.
Many of the fleets or flotillas that a break up of the RN and RAF would provide would create utterly useless and unmanageable “units”. What military value does 0.12 of an aircraft carrier provide you? Of course, no military value at all.
● It is – just – viable to talk about a squadron of 10–12
Tornado GR4s with 4–5 attrition aircraft. It is also very rational to look to a “wing” of 18 Typhoon with a reserve of five aircraft. A group of four Chinook – just – might make sense. But four C-130s? Or one Nimrod, at best? These are numbers that simply do not make sense.
● And even if one can make a case for a small unit of aircraft, or even a couple of ships, what are the implications for supporting so few? Thinking of ships, looking around the world – and countries such as Norway, New Zealand and so forth do spring to mind as comparators – you tend to need at least three ships of a kind so as to provide cost effective support. So the – at best – two Type 23s would not really make a worthwhile flotilla. Think about it: Chile bought three ....
Of course, it is certain that the SNP would say that in the case of a break up of the British armed forces, there would – of course – be a bit of give-and-take, as well as some haggling as regards who got what. But you know what? In most cases, an independent Scotland would be in a weak negotiating position. If you “own” 0.12 of a ship, you are not in a very good position to demand top dollar for it. It is pretty much the same as a small minority stake in a company: it gives you no control, and has limited value.
Likewise, if you have the “right” to one Nimrod MRA4, you, too, cannot ask top whack for it if you are trying to sell it back to London. After all, it would be prohibitively expensive to support a single Nimrod on its own. But can England take another Nimrod airframe, and with the mission systems already bought, convert one to replace that “lost” to Scotland? Of course. And if you cannot agree on a price, what would Edinburgh do? Go on e-bay with an advert: “I am selling: one Nimrod MRA-4”? An orphan aircraft will not command a top price. Defence Analysis feels that this is true for most calculations of the ship split, as well as for the Harriers and many non-fast jet types.
Of course, as far as the Army is concerned, the independent SNP would probably ask, as a matter of right, for the following:
● The five regular battalions of the Royal Regiment of
Scotland.
● The Scots Guards.
● 45 Commando, Royal Marines.
● The two TA Infantry regiments, plus elements of 4 (V)
PARA.
● The Scots Dragoon Guards, plus elements of 1 Royal
Tank Regiment.
● 19 (Highland Regiment), 40 (Lowland Regiment) Royal
Artillery.
● Elements of 16 and 32 Regiments Royal Artillery.
Points to note:
● Apart from the fact of bad recruiting, Scotland would
“take” a disproportionate share of infantry regiments,
15% or so if 45 Commando is included.
● The share of armoured units is light on that basis of
calculation, but more in line with the figures of share of
population or GDP.
● Scotland also looks about right as regards artillery
regiments.
● An independent Scotland seems to be “short” of signals
and logistics units.
It is certain that as far as the SNP, as political masters of an independent Scotland are concerned, the haggling could be along the lines – reasonable lines, too – of, “OK, we’ll return the seven Harriers, if you will give us 2.4 more C-130J’s”. A trade for their share of C-17, and a Nimrod might net some more Merlins or a Chinook or two extra.
In a similar fashion, trading in the SSN – if they can get that agreed upon – as well as the shares in the CVS and LPD/LPH might get an RFA oiler or two, and perhaps one or two more escorts, and even an LSD(A) or so.
This is all assuming that there is a very logical, and reasonable process of assessing who gets what, and at what value. Naturally, the SNP will try to pitch at somewhere around a rather ridiculous 20–25% share, and London will obviously start at the 4–5% level. That is why Defence
Analysis feels that a 10% share is probably defensible on most sides, and could be justified.
POLICY AND SHAPE
But the above analysis does assume that an independent Scotland wishes to be a “Mini Me” of the current UK armed forces. And from the policy statements of the SNP, this is not very likely.
“Scotland will maintain active defence commitments with its friends and allies through the United Nations, European Union and Partnership for Peace.”
OK, this might sound totally cynical, but any defence policy that bases all of its activities on the UN, the EU, and PfP is going to have a similar outcome to the defence policies of Ireland, Belgium or Portugal. If your poster idol for defence policy is the EU, then there is one truth: you aren’t going to get involved in any serious operations. If someone might shoot back at you, you will decide to not deploy. That has been the logic seen in countries that have championed the EU/UN lines of development in defence. Sorry, but it’s true.
As a by-the-by, although Partnership for Peace is a NATO initiative, isn’t it interesting that the SNP does not explicitly mention NATO as a driver for its defence policy? Does that mean that Scotland might try to obtain only observer status in NATO? Does this mean that, looking at recent events, when the NATO Secretary General and SACEUR were calling for more troops and helicopters for Afghanistan, an independent Scotland would be firmly on the side of France, Germany and Italy, sticking to reservations, and failing to find any news assets?
One implication to draw from this, as regards shape and so forth, also comes from the SNP’s defence policy document, which states that the chief aims of an independent Scottish defence policy would be, “... the defence of Scottish land, sea and air ....”This does not really suggest that an SNP-run Scotland would be keen on deployed operations. We are not seeing the type of policy being implemented in another smallish (in population terms, at least) country, Australia, whose defence policy is firmly expeditionary in nature and fact.
In which case, would an SNP-run Scotland want, for example, Main Battle Tanks? Would Edinburgh go down the path of Canada or Belgium and simply sell off all heavy artillery, tanks, and MICVs, instead opting to buy LAVs in myriad roles?
Would such a Scotland want attack aircraft, Storm Shadow cruise missiles? Of course, they could try to bargain them away for things that were desirable for an independent Scotland. But once again, the rule is applied: an eager seller never get as much as a cautious one. And if the United UK won’t pay inflated prices, the chances of getting good prices for small batches of kit on the export market are equally limited. Want to buy 52 Challenger 2 MBTs, squire? Slightly used ...?
BUDGET AND SHAPE
Another key guide to what happens after an independence referendum is what sort of budget an independent Scotland would have. Take the following figures, and as started above, trying to get what a normal human being would describe as “definitive” ones is difficult:
● UK GDP £1.16-trillion
● Scottish GDP £76-billion
● UK GDP/Scottish GDP ratio 6.5%
● Other GDP ratios 8–10%
From this, we can take the low of 6.5% and a high of 10%, although the latter has been regarded by all who have seen it as insanely high. Nevertheless .... Scottish GDP could be as high as £120–130-billion.
But now let us look at what the existing spend on defence is as a proportion of GDP in the UK: 2.3%. So what range does this give for an independent Scotland?
● High Defence Spend: £2.76-billion
● Low Defence Spend: £1.75-billion
So what? What are the metrics against which we should examine these figures. Well, what about the defence spends of a few other European countries, including the one that SNP politicians love to compare themselves to, Norway:
Defence Spend (£) % of GDP
Norway £2.28-billion 1.7%
Belgium £2.25-billion 1.3%
Ireland £450-million 0.5%
Points to note:
● Even while spending less in GDP terms than the UK, both Norway and Belgium spend very close to what the upper range that an independent Scotland might spend on defence, basing that on the UK figure of today.
● Norway’s GDP is slightly more than twice that of an independent Scotland, and yet there seems to be little drive to boost defence spending.
● The last two countries are used as examples of what happens to defence spending when you decide that you want the UN and EU to be your guides.
The point of the comparison with these countries is to reinforce another point: all of these countries have had to make serious decisions about which military capabilities they drop, simply because they cannot afford them to cover all the bases. Defence Analysis feels very comfortable in stating that the example of places such as Belgium and Norway is that they have had to make hard choices: and Scotland would have to make the same type of decisions. Capabilities would be
dropped. Belgium decided to drop all heavy armour and artillery, Norway has also shaved its heavier forces, as well as some aspects of overseas operations capability. It is simple: if you are only spending £2–3-billion, then you will not have that many options open as regards military capabilities.
more to follow