Hallo!
This thread has been very interesting so far and even the over-emotional contribution(s) contain valuable information. By the way: Around Christmas a German magazine published a long and very personal article on behalf of Captain Marty that in essence contained the same observations as those described by 'wallabie'.
I have just a few observations / remarks / questions however:
1.) Only one hour before takeoff, a thrust reverser was repaired hurriedly. To me it seems logical therefore, that the F/E shut down the burning engine so quickly: He may have assumed (as did all the mass media and 'experts' in the first hours afer the crash) that the problem was originating from a badly repaired reverser. In this case, an immediate(!!!) shutdown of the affected engine would have been the only sensible option! Maybe the crew even discussed and briefed this point while the repairs were executed? At least my experience after ten years of commercial flying is that the most dangerous aeroplanes are those that come right out of the maintenance hangar (and this in one of the most regulated countries in the world).
2.) I read the CVR transcripts several times but did find nothing related to stall warning or stickshaker noises. The only aural warnings (apart from the fire horns) were, on the contrary, 'pull up' prompts from the GPWS. Why then should the captain have pushed the nose down? I do not fly jets myself but in his situation - without a clear stall warning - I think I would have acted exactly the way he did. Pushing the nose down in this situation is a final decision after which the only option is a crash landing between the fields, highways and houses. As long as he had some control left and no clear indication of an imminent stall, he had no reason to take this decision.
3.) I strongly doubt that the Concorde could have been evacuated after whatever landing it may have made. The rear end was already burning - all exits would have led directly into the flames - and the front end would probably have sustained heavy damages on impact or during the collapse of the half-retracted landing gear.
4.) I think, that their CRM was not so bad after all. The roles were clearly distributed and everybody performed his task as good as he could. There simply wasn't enough time for double-checking and discussions. Especially the F/O as non-handling pilot did exactly what I learned in my CRM course: He handled communications, decided upon the landing site, monitored the instruments. Maybe better communications before takeoff could have saved them, but recalculating the v-speeds and required field length in respect to the tailwind would not have prevented them from taking off, I suppose.
Thanks for listening, max