Right now, based on the Dryden experience, it looks like we may be seeing the foundations being laid for a future accident, which with hindsight (like with almost every accident) everyone will say was preventable if only sufficient funds had been invested, etc.
I think so.
Placing a commercial enterprise motivated only by profit in charge of "expensive" safety processes will inevitably put such processes (and resources) at risk in terms of financial support and focus.
The operation becomes one of patch-work, ad-hoc crisis-management activities instead of one guided by a properly implemented, correctly resourced and fully utilized SMS program. In large airline operations the problems multiply because communications of "expensive" priorities tends to be pushed out by stronger commercial, (cost-control) messages. Short-term commercial goals do not support long-term planning of safety programs which tend to cost a great deal of money but produce "nothing" in return that can be shown on a balance sheet. If for example safety data is "inconvenient", (ie, will result in demonstrable commercial losses if acted upon), that data can tend to be "set aside" or quietly forgotten in the daily pagaent where "next!", is all-important. Resourcing safety programs faces such internal opposition as you may know and box-ticking becomes the solution.
Such traditional approaches only prevent the second accident, as you mention in the quote above.