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Old 7th Dec 2007, 08:04
  #1973 (permalink)  
Safety_Helmut
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Ed

It's easy to misunderstand some of the comments in this very long thread, many of them are made on the basis of what has gone before. Can I clear up a few things.

Yes, a safety case was ordered. Yes, it was accepted at face value (not condoned) and yes it was therefore supported. It is a fact that the analysis in the NSC was flawed and no-one spotted the errors until the BOI spotted them. One cannot lie if one doesn't know the truth.
Most of the Safety Cases for in-service aircraft have not been properly scrutinised, in fact, many of them are not capable of passing close scrutiny. So in all probability, no one has even looked for possible errors. This is a failing of the IPT and of the MoD's Safety and Airworthiness management system.

I have to say this, unpalatable as it is, but ground engineering officers would never have spotted those errors. Why? Because they don't know everything about how the aircraft is operated. They don't need to. No air engineer was ever given the opportunity to participate in the NSC; indeed we didn't even know it existed. Had we been given sight of it, the errors would have been seen immediately.
The type of analyses needed to build a Safety Case requires expert input from a number of sources. It needs the participation of the designer (BAES), maintenance (RAF Engineering), operators (aircrew) and other specialists as required. The whole analysis needs to be led by an experienced Safety Engineer who understands the difference between a hazard, failure and fault etc. Many people don't ! The input needs to come from experienced people, not just a desk officer on a two year tour in the IPT either. In many cases this will best come from experienced SNCOs . You don't have to worry that the specialists brought in may not fully understand the analysis process. The Safety Engineers are there for that. There are similar requirements for reviewing the Safety Case. It is not just simply a case of reading it. When a claim is made, it has to be questioned, you have to look for the evidence to support a claim, in short, it has to be justified.

Much of what I describe above will be alien to many IPTs, because they simply don't do it. They don't understand that they need to do it, and they don't understand why they need to do it. If that sounds like incompetence, then......................

The simple fact is this: the RAF never had the opportunity to lie about the NSC. We never knew it was flawed.
The IPTL is responsible for assuring himself that the aircraft has an acceptable Safety Case. Not knowing it was flawed will not be a defence in a court of law. If you have not looked for those flaws, now that would be indefensible. That will be the position that virtually all of the IPTs will be in.


S_H
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