Scribbler,
Questioning the validity of an independant RAF is a common trait of the Army in particular. I always counter with the comment that the very fact they are suggesting it demonstrates ignorance of the issues, and therefore exactly why we need to retain a seperate AF. Prior to 1918, the Army and RN had failed to cope adequately with the emerging nature of Air Power. There were parallel and duplicate procurement, staffing, training, doctrinal and equipment programmes to ensure that each service got the air support it needed. Result: lack of synergy. Lack of effect. Waste of finances and resources. Evidence the 'Independant Force' of 1918. Evidence the AD of the UK. Evidence WWI ASW. Inevitably, both the Army and RN sought to further it's own bespoke requirements for Air Power at the expense of the other.
Later, just prior to WWII the Army embarked on a determined campaign to procure large numbers of slow army coop types which would be allocated to Army control. This would have been achieved at the expense of fighter and bomber procurement. Sound familiar? Well, if we'd have followed their advice, the Summer of 1940 would have resulted in a slightly different outcome I'd suggest. Likewise, one of the reasons the Luftwaffe fared so badly from 1941 onwards was that it was established as a tactical arm with Army requirements at the fore of tactics and procurement. When the war didn't finish as quickly as anticipated, they did not have the wider capabilities to take the battle to us. Equally, they lost the technological EW battle in terms of C2, radar and ECM largely because they had not developed defensive systems to the same extent as the UK had.
However, no doubt our Army and RN colleagues would argue that all this history is irrelevant to todays scenarios, so let's look at it in a modern context with a few of the arguments normally put forward.
1. Battlefield Helos. I actually used to be fairly sanguine about whether the Army took all SH from the RAF. However, having spent 4 months in an Army HQ in Iraq, I was appalled at how inefficiently they used air power. It was used by whoever had the hughest rank in the discussion. If the GOC wanted a taxi to get him somewhere, the Merlins were tasked and bugger the troops on the ground. Likewise, whilst the AAC have some superb SNCO pilots, their officers are frankly tactically far less able than their RAF and RN counterparts. This is because the AAC officer pilots have considerably less flying and tactical experience due to the need to jump through other Army career hoops. I have a lot of time for the AAC, but too often I meet AAC SO1s who have more deployed experience planning repairs to Iraqi sewage systems than they have of integrating into BH packages.
And that's just the basic rotary tasks. How practised do you think Army Merlin crews would remain in CSAR/JPR if the Army got control of them? CSAR/JPR requires regular practice with COMAO/AWACS/SIGINT to be able to penetrate hostile airspace. It may also be worthy of note that, since RN and RAF SH came under HQ Land as part of JHC, funding priorities for FBR etc have dropped considerably. That suggests that they are not as committed towards BH as they claim.
2. Give the Nimrod to the RN. Excellent idea; except that the primary task of the MR2 today is overland surveillance. So perhaps we should give it to the Army? But then how much priority would the Army afford ASW/ASuW? If the RN got it, how much priority would you give to the overland role? And what of the MRA4? That'll have a very capable ELINT/C2 and weapons capability. Who gets that? How do you apportion trg? And what of the R1? Or do you suggest we give the MR2 to the RN and the R1 to the Army?!!!!
3. Let the RN and army assume fighter and attack roles respectively?! Modern assets such as Typhoon and F-35 are dual role. How can this be divided effectively? If the RN maintain the AD role presumably they'd only train with AD weapons/tactics and have money spent on them accordingly as upgrades/new weapons were integrated? That would require an increasingly seperate staff and engineering support. Meanwhile, I assume army fast jet aircrew would concentrate on CAS/strike? Similarly therefore, they'd need to train only in A-G weapons/tactics etc. So in our next conflict we have an RN F-35 DCA CAP and an AAC F-35 CAS stack? What happens when we need more A-A? The army mates won't be trained! What happens if we need extra CAS? The RN are trained and loaded only for A-A. What happens if the CVF deck is blacked by a mishap and we have only army CAS roled/trained/armed F-35 available? All we'd succeed in is creating less flexible and more stovepiped forces.
4. Give AT to the Army or contract it out. Similar issues as with BH. When the Army were allocated their own C-130 in Basra, they used them extremely inefficiently. When they were 'rear based' to Al Udeid so that resources could be better harnessed, they screamed blue murder that it would never work. Then we explained that it had been done a week earlier and they hadn't noticed! Likewise, how much attention would AAR get if FSTA came under Land? Very little until it was too late I'd suggest. In terms of contracted support, how much would we need to pay for a contracter to be willing to fly NVG C-130 flights into hot LZs in Afghanistan and Iraq? How much would we be charged for airliners to fly into airbases where there is a considerable MANPADS threat? How do we verify the proficiencies, DAS and EW PFM of such companies? And of course these aircraft also conduct AAR and classified tasks.
5. The detractors of the RAF also generally neglect to consider AWACS, SIGINT, ASTOR, Recce, SAR, FAC, SEAD, Comms and flying trg tasks, to name but a few. How can these often inherently Joint tasks be divided between the other services?
Independant air forces around the world evolved because of the very nature of Air Power. Uniquely, Air Power (be it from an land, maritime or air component asset) is able to be applied accross the battlespace in the full spectrum of ops from tactical to strategic in the same mission and potentially within seconds, certainly minutes. Inevtiably, such capabilities can therefore be called upon by both the land and maritime components. Independant air forces act as an 'independant broker' to ensure that a balance is maintained and efforts not duplicated. Such capabilities cannot be conveniently packaged neatly between land and maritime forces.
After stating that, despite all of the above, I remain a strong advocate of organic army and RN aviation, I shall now retire from my soapbox!!
Regards,
MM