Does RAF still have any unique selling point?
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Does RAF still have any unique selling point?
Just back from a few weeks in the 'Stan, and found myself dragged repeatedly into intense debates with matelots and pongoes as to whether the RAF has any future, or justification.
I loyally stuck up for all things light blue - as one who briefly wore the uniform - but also found myself pondering the arguments of those who believe it would make sense for CAS, SH, Hercs etc. all to be an Army function, or for Harrier to be a dark blue show in preparation for the carriers, and so on...
I know we've all been round this buoy before but I felt poorly-qualified to stick up for the RAF, and I'm interested to hear the best arguments anyone here would muster for its continued existence.
For the sake of discussion - playing devil's advocate rather than a troll - what harm would it do for Odiham / Benson communities to join the Army, which provides most of their passengers, cargo and landing sites?
Likewise strike / CAS. If Cottesmore's finest drop weapons in support of (mostly-Army) troops on the ground why not make them all part of the same (Army) service, rather than a joint RAF/Navy force?
Or, if they're all going to operate off big carriers in the end, why not badge them all RN?
Similarly, I've heard it argued, Marham / Lossie might as well be Army, as they 'achieve an effect on the ground.' And so it goes on.
In short, the Army and RN have long histories of operating in the air. What is the RAF bringing to the party in the next 20 years or so that nobody else can bring?
I loyally stuck up for all things light blue - as one who briefly wore the uniform - but also found myself pondering the arguments of those who believe it would make sense for CAS, SH, Hercs etc. all to be an Army function, or for Harrier to be a dark blue show in preparation for the carriers, and so on...
I know we've all been round this buoy before but I felt poorly-qualified to stick up for the RAF, and I'm interested to hear the best arguments anyone here would muster for its continued existence.
For the sake of discussion - playing devil's advocate rather than a troll - what harm would it do for Odiham / Benson communities to join the Army, which provides most of their passengers, cargo and landing sites?
Likewise strike / CAS. If Cottesmore's finest drop weapons in support of (mostly-Army) troops on the ground why not make them all part of the same (Army) service, rather than a joint RAF/Navy force?
Or, if they're all going to operate off big carriers in the end, why not badge them all RN?
Similarly, I've heard it argued, Marham / Lossie might as well be Army, as they 'achieve an effect on the ground.' And so it goes on.
In short, the Army and RN have long histories of operating in the air. What is the RAF bringing to the party in the next 20 years or so that nobody else can bring?
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On the other hand, why not let the army concentrate on its core business of taking and holding ground while CAS and SH are provided by a professonal body who specialise in military avaiation?
Similarly, as their lordships have decided that the fleet does not need an intrinsic airborne defence capability, there is not a good reason why the Harrier force should be anything other than light blue.
Bear
Similarly, as their lordships have decided that the fleet does not need an intrinsic airborne defence capability, there is not a good reason why the Harrier force should be anything other than light blue.
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The UK was the first country to have an independant air force. Why would almost every other nation follow suit if it was such a bad idea?
This one has been flogged to death many times before so I'll keep it short and sweet. Navy - sea; Army - land; Air Force - air; seems to be a very sensible, efficient and logical division of responsibility to me, but government and the MoD exist to continually re-invent the wheel and fix things that aint broke!
Many of the most outspoken advocates of carving up the RAF are senior pongos and fisheads, whose understanding of air power is limited and flawed, and who are often publishing their memoirs at the same time. Tim Collins take note.
This one has been flogged to death many times before so I'll keep it short and sweet. Navy - sea; Army - land; Air Force - air; seems to be a very sensible, efficient and logical division of responsibility to me, but government and the MoD exist to continually re-invent the wheel and fix things that aint broke!
Many of the most outspoken advocates of carving up the RAF are senior pongos and fisheads, whose understanding of air power is limited and flawed, and who are often publishing their memoirs at the same time. Tim Collins take note.
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Even if all three were just merged into one great big purple blot on the landscape, it would be most efficient to have within that single organisation the "sea" specialists, the "land" specialists and the "air" specialists, so why fiddle with it?
As for what the RAF brings to the party that the others can't ... the RAF gets the best-looking birds!
As for what the RAF brings to the party that the others can't ... the RAF gets the best-looking birds!
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Scribbler,
Questioning the validity of an independant RAF is a common trait of the Army in particular. I always counter with the comment that the very fact they are suggesting it demonstrates ignorance of the issues, and therefore exactly why we need to retain a seperate AF. Prior to 1918, the Army and RN had failed to cope adequately with the emerging nature of Air Power. There were parallel and duplicate procurement, staffing, training, doctrinal and equipment programmes to ensure that each service got the air support it needed. Result: lack of synergy. Lack of effect. Waste of finances and resources. Evidence the 'Independant Force' of 1918. Evidence the AD of the UK. Evidence WWI ASW. Inevitably, both the Army and RN sought to further it's own bespoke requirements for Air Power at the expense of the other.
Later, just prior to WWII the Army embarked on a determined campaign to procure large numbers of slow army coop types which would be allocated to Army control. This would have been achieved at the expense of fighter and bomber procurement. Sound familiar? Well, if we'd have followed their advice, the Summer of 1940 would have resulted in a slightly different outcome I'd suggest. Likewise, one of the reasons the Luftwaffe fared so badly from 1941 onwards was that it was established as a tactical arm with Army requirements at the fore of tactics and procurement. When the war didn't finish as quickly as anticipated, they did not have the wider capabilities to take the battle to us. Equally, they lost the technological EW battle in terms of C2, radar and ECM largely because they had not developed defensive systems to the same extent as the UK had.
However, no doubt our Army and RN colleagues would argue that all this history is irrelevant to todays scenarios, so let's look at it in a modern context with a few of the arguments normally put forward.
1. Battlefield Helos. I actually used to be fairly sanguine about whether the Army took all SH from the RAF. However, having spent 4 months in an Army HQ in Iraq, I was appalled at how inefficiently they used air power. It was used by whoever had the hughest rank in the discussion. If the GOC wanted a taxi to get him somewhere, the Merlins were tasked and bugger the troops on the ground. Likewise, whilst the AAC have some superb SNCO pilots, their officers are frankly tactically far less able than their RAF and RN counterparts. This is because the AAC officer pilots have considerably less flying and tactical experience due to the need to jump through other Army career hoops. I have a lot of time for the AAC, but too often I meet AAC SO1s who have more deployed experience planning repairs to Iraqi sewage systems than they have of integrating into BH packages.
And that's just the basic rotary tasks. How practised do you think Army Merlin crews would remain in CSAR/JPR if the Army got control of them? CSAR/JPR requires regular practice with COMAO/AWACS/SIGINT to be able to penetrate hostile airspace. It may also be worthy of note that, since RN and RAF SH came under HQ Land as part of JHC, funding priorities for FBR etc have dropped considerably. That suggests that they are not as committed towards BH as they claim.
2. Give the Nimrod to the RN. Excellent idea; except that the primary task of the MR2 today is overland surveillance. So perhaps we should give it to the Army? But then how much priority would the Army afford ASW/ASuW? If the RN got it, how much priority would you give to the overland role? And what of the MRA4? That'll have a very capable ELINT/C2 and weapons capability. Who gets that? How do you apportion trg? And what of the R1? Or do you suggest we give the MR2 to the RN and the R1 to the Army?!!!!
3. Let the RN and army assume fighter and attack roles respectively?! Modern assets such as Typhoon and F-35 are dual role. How can this be divided effectively? If the RN maintain the AD role presumably they'd only train with AD weapons/tactics and have money spent on them accordingly as upgrades/new weapons were integrated? That would require an increasingly seperate staff and engineering support. Meanwhile, I assume army fast jet aircrew would concentrate on CAS/strike? Similarly therefore, they'd need to train only in A-G weapons/tactics etc. So in our next conflict we have an RN F-35 DCA CAP and an AAC F-35 CAS stack? What happens when we need more A-A? The army mates won't be trained! What happens if we need extra CAS? The RN are trained and loaded only for A-A. What happens if the CVF deck is blacked by a mishap and we have only army CAS roled/trained/armed F-35 available? All we'd succeed in is creating less flexible and more stovepiped forces.
4. Give AT to the Army or contract it out. Similar issues as with BH. When the Army were allocated their own C-130 in Basra, they used them extremely inefficiently. When they were 'rear based' to Al Udeid so that resources could be better harnessed, they screamed blue murder that it would never work. Then we explained that it had been done a week earlier and they hadn't noticed! Likewise, how much attention would AAR get if FSTA came under Land? Very little until it was too late I'd suggest. In terms of contracted support, how much would we need to pay for a contracter to be willing to fly NVG C-130 flights into hot LZs in Afghanistan and Iraq? How much would we be charged for airliners to fly into airbases where there is a considerable MANPADS threat? How do we verify the proficiencies, DAS and EW PFM of such companies? And of course these aircraft also conduct AAR and classified tasks.
5. The detractors of the RAF also generally neglect to consider AWACS, SIGINT, ASTOR, Recce, SAR, FAC, SEAD, Comms and flying trg tasks, to name but a few. How can these often inherently Joint tasks be divided between the other services?
Independant air forces around the world evolved because of the very nature of Air Power. Uniquely, Air Power (be it from an land, maritime or air component asset) is able to be applied accross the battlespace in the full spectrum of ops from tactical to strategic in the same mission and potentially within seconds, certainly minutes. Inevtiably, such capabilities can therefore be called upon by both the land and maritime components. Independant air forces act as an 'independant broker' to ensure that a balance is maintained and efforts not duplicated. Such capabilities cannot be conveniently packaged neatly between land and maritime forces.
After stating that, despite all of the above, I remain a strong advocate of organic army and RN aviation, I shall now retire from my soapbox!!
Regards,
MM
Questioning the validity of an independant RAF is a common trait of the Army in particular. I always counter with the comment that the very fact they are suggesting it demonstrates ignorance of the issues, and therefore exactly why we need to retain a seperate AF. Prior to 1918, the Army and RN had failed to cope adequately with the emerging nature of Air Power. There were parallel and duplicate procurement, staffing, training, doctrinal and equipment programmes to ensure that each service got the air support it needed. Result: lack of synergy. Lack of effect. Waste of finances and resources. Evidence the 'Independant Force' of 1918. Evidence the AD of the UK. Evidence WWI ASW. Inevitably, both the Army and RN sought to further it's own bespoke requirements for Air Power at the expense of the other.
Later, just prior to WWII the Army embarked on a determined campaign to procure large numbers of slow army coop types which would be allocated to Army control. This would have been achieved at the expense of fighter and bomber procurement. Sound familiar? Well, if we'd have followed their advice, the Summer of 1940 would have resulted in a slightly different outcome I'd suggest. Likewise, one of the reasons the Luftwaffe fared so badly from 1941 onwards was that it was established as a tactical arm with Army requirements at the fore of tactics and procurement. When the war didn't finish as quickly as anticipated, they did not have the wider capabilities to take the battle to us. Equally, they lost the technological EW battle in terms of C2, radar and ECM largely because they had not developed defensive systems to the same extent as the UK had.
However, no doubt our Army and RN colleagues would argue that all this history is irrelevant to todays scenarios, so let's look at it in a modern context with a few of the arguments normally put forward.
1. Battlefield Helos. I actually used to be fairly sanguine about whether the Army took all SH from the RAF. However, having spent 4 months in an Army HQ in Iraq, I was appalled at how inefficiently they used air power. It was used by whoever had the hughest rank in the discussion. If the GOC wanted a taxi to get him somewhere, the Merlins were tasked and bugger the troops on the ground. Likewise, whilst the AAC have some superb SNCO pilots, their officers are frankly tactically far less able than their RAF and RN counterparts. This is because the AAC officer pilots have considerably less flying and tactical experience due to the need to jump through other Army career hoops. I have a lot of time for the AAC, but too often I meet AAC SO1s who have more deployed experience planning repairs to Iraqi sewage systems than they have of integrating into BH packages.
And that's just the basic rotary tasks. How practised do you think Army Merlin crews would remain in CSAR/JPR if the Army got control of them? CSAR/JPR requires regular practice with COMAO/AWACS/SIGINT to be able to penetrate hostile airspace. It may also be worthy of note that, since RN and RAF SH came under HQ Land as part of JHC, funding priorities for FBR etc have dropped considerably. That suggests that they are not as committed towards BH as they claim.
2. Give the Nimrod to the RN. Excellent idea; except that the primary task of the MR2 today is overland surveillance. So perhaps we should give it to the Army? But then how much priority would the Army afford ASW/ASuW? If the RN got it, how much priority would you give to the overland role? And what of the MRA4? That'll have a very capable ELINT/C2 and weapons capability. Who gets that? How do you apportion trg? And what of the R1? Or do you suggest we give the MR2 to the RN and the R1 to the Army?!!!!
3. Let the RN and army assume fighter and attack roles respectively?! Modern assets such as Typhoon and F-35 are dual role. How can this be divided effectively? If the RN maintain the AD role presumably they'd only train with AD weapons/tactics and have money spent on them accordingly as upgrades/new weapons were integrated? That would require an increasingly seperate staff and engineering support. Meanwhile, I assume army fast jet aircrew would concentrate on CAS/strike? Similarly therefore, they'd need to train only in A-G weapons/tactics etc. So in our next conflict we have an RN F-35 DCA CAP and an AAC F-35 CAS stack? What happens when we need more A-A? The army mates won't be trained! What happens if we need extra CAS? The RN are trained and loaded only for A-A. What happens if the CVF deck is blacked by a mishap and we have only army CAS roled/trained/armed F-35 available? All we'd succeed in is creating less flexible and more stovepiped forces.
4. Give AT to the Army or contract it out. Similar issues as with BH. When the Army were allocated their own C-130 in Basra, they used them extremely inefficiently. When they were 'rear based' to Al Udeid so that resources could be better harnessed, they screamed blue murder that it would never work. Then we explained that it had been done a week earlier and they hadn't noticed! Likewise, how much attention would AAR get if FSTA came under Land? Very little until it was too late I'd suggest. In terms of contracted support, how much would we need to pay for a contracter to be willing to fly NVG C-130 flights into hot LZs in Afghanistan and Iraq? How much would we be charged for airliners to fly into airbases where there is a considerable MANPADS threat? How do we verify the proficiencies, DAS and EW PFM of such companies? And of course these aircraft also conduct AAR and classified tasks.
5. The detractors of the RAF also generally neglect to consider AWACS, SIGINT, ASTOR, Recce, SAR, FAC, SEAD, Comms and flying trg tasks, to name but a few. How can these often inherently Joint tasks be divided between the other services?
Independant air forces around the world evolved because of the very nature of Air Power. Uniquely, Air Power (be it from an land, maritime or air component asset) is able to be applied accross the battlespace in the full spectrum of ops from tactical to strategic in the same mission and potentially within seconds, certainly minutes. Inevtiably, such capabilities can therefore be called upon by both the land and maritime components. Independant air forces act as an 'independant broker' to ensure that a balance is maintained and efforts not duplicated. Such capabilities cannot be conveniently packaged neatly between land and maritime forces.
After stating that, despite all of the above, I remain a strong advocate of organic army and RN aviation, I shall now retire from my soapbox!!
Regards,
MM
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course we have a unique selling point
did ya not see the clothing booklet in last weeks times on Sunday
uou could get everything from underpants to chino's and jumpers with the RAF crest on it!!!!
So not only air powere but a cracking clothing range as well
did ya not see the clothing booklet in last weeks times on Sunday
uou could get everything from underpants to chino's and jumpers with the RAF crest on it!!!!
So not only air powere but a cracking clothing range as well
I don't own this space under my name. I should have leased it while I still could
"Give the Nimrod to the Navy"
My counter when we had 4 sqns is the same as my argument now only doubled and redoubled.
The RAF has a large training input and a large pool of aircrew. Crews to man the Nimrod are drawn from all the RAF aicrew and can, when time expired, be posted to other types.
If the Navy had to recruit and train for just the Nimrod and Helos where would they put those that were suitable as aircrew but unsuited to their limited roles or manpower requirements.
It simply makes more sense to have all the aircrew in one service. I would make an exception for the Army as their AAC is a sufficiently large entity to have an economic training system and a unique role.
You could make the argument for all RN aircrew to be in light blue uniforms.
My counter when we had 4 sqns is the same as my argument now only doubled and redoubled.
The RAF has a large training input and a large pool of aircrew. Crews to man the Nimrod are drawn from all the RAF aicrew and can, when time expired, be posted to other types.
If the Navy had to recruit and train for just the Nimrod and Helos where would they put those that were suitable as aircrew but unsuited to their limited roles or manpower requirements.
It simply makes more sense to have all the aircrew in one service. I would make an exception for the Army as their AAC is a sufficiently large entity to have an economic training system and a unique role.
You could make the argument for all RN aircrew to be in light blue uniforms.
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Pontious,
Where did you get the idea that the AAC was "sufficiently large" in comparison to the FAA? If you remove the TA gazelle pilots there are not huge numbers left.
Scribbler et al,
The case for the RAF to exist is pretty sound and generally the Service does it fairly well. But the RAF needs to learn to accept that it does not do everything well (loads of recent examples of where it doesn't) and that the FAA and AAC have something to bring to the party (and have a very proud history of doing so). Stop the squabbling and support each other or we are all doomed.
I can't help feeling that if a non-pointy was sat at the top of the RAF tree and a non-pointy was put in charge of 1 Gp life would be more harmonious all round.
Where did you get the idea that the AAC was "sufficiently large" in comparison to the FAA? If you remove the TA gazelle pilots there are not huge numbers left.
Scribbler et al,
The case for the RAF to exist is pretty sound and generally the Service does it fairly well. But the RAF needs to learn to accept that it does not do everything well (loads of recent examples of where it doesn't) and that the FAA and AAC have something to bring to the party (and have a very proud history of doing so). Stop the squabbling and support each other or we are all doomed.
I can't help feeling that if a non-pointy was sat at the top of the RAF tree and a non-pointy was put in charge of 1 Gp life would be more harmonious all round.
I don't own this space under my name. I should have leased it while I still could
Bismark, from JHC?
No I can't argue the point as I am out of touch with Navy Air.
You could argue the point for all helicopters to be under a single unified command.
oh, they are?
Point about picking aircrew from a larger pool remans.
No I can't argue the point as I am out of touch with Navy Air.
You could argue the point for all helicopters to be under a single unified command.
oh, they are?
Point about picking aircrew from a larger pool remans.
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You could make the argument for all RN aircrew to be in light blue uniforms
And the comment about Lossie......remember that Lossie is a Naval Air Station...... you just borrowed it....(we may want it back)
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MM - I would dispute some of your points in regards to the Luftwaffe. Certainly it was a very tactically minded air arm but just look at the aircraft introduced post 1941. The Arado light jet bomber - the Me262 - the Fw 190 in all it's variants and the likes of the night fighter Me410. How this equipment was used very much depended on the orders from above.
It would be wrong to suggest that the Luftwaffe wasn't effective in changing roles - look at the efforts made to stem the bomber flows into Germany. Certainly the offensive stance changed but they were still a formidable force even in late 1944.
Regards radar - examine the circumstances - and the British interest in
examples of German radar technology after the war and it becomes clear that we were probably even in terms of technology - not far ahead .
It would be wrong to suggest that the Luftwaffe wasn't effective in changing roles - look at the efforts made to stem the bomber flows into Germany. Certainly the offensive stance changed but they were still a formidable force even in late 1944.
Regards radar - examine the circumstances - and the British interest in
examples of German radar technology after the war and it becomes clear that we were probably even in terms of technology - not far ahead .
From the RAF Website:
RAF Lossiemouth was built during 1938 and 1939 and opened on May 1, 1939 with No 15 Flying Training School as the major unit. In April 1940, the station was handed over to Bomber Command and No 20 Operational Training Unit was formed together with No 46 Maintenance Unit. At the end of the World War II hostilities, the station became a satellite of RAF Milltown in Coastal Command before becoming HMS Fulmar of the Royal Navy in 1946, the primary task being Fleet Air Arm operations. With the impending demise of aircraft carriers, the RAF returned on 28 September 1972 and the station has steadily assumed greater status since then. Aircraft types have included Whirlwind, Jaguar, Shackleton, Sea King, Hunter, Buccaneer and Tornado employed in various roles including search and rescue, airborne early warning, operational conversion unit, tactical weapons unit and maritime strike/attack. Ground-based units have included the air and ground defence, airfield damage repair and airfield support roles. With its present Tornado GR4 compliment of 3 operational units – Nos 12, 14 and 617 Squadrons and one operational conversion unit – No XV (Reserve) Squadron, its Sea King HAR 3A helicopter search and rescue unit – ‘D’ Flight, No 202 Squadron and 2 ground defence units – Nos 51 and 2622 (Highland) Squadrons RAF Regiment, RAF Lossiemouth is one of the foremost stations in the Royal Air Force
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M-M for PJHQ?
Riley,
We're in danger of thread creep here, however I don't doubt German technological capabilities regarding aircraft design in WWII (although the Me410 wasn't a nightfighter). However, their wider technological weaknesses were directly as a result of their tactical emphasis.
As far as their EW efforts regarding the night bomber offensive, their initial capabilities were hampered by the almost complete absence of a defensive radar network and, more importantly a C2 system (although the few Freya and Wurzberg radars they did possess were arguably more capable than the British Chain Home). A large reason that they hadn't invested in a defensive C2 system was because they were tactically focused upon offensive land ops.
Where we did have and retain a lead was in airborne EW technology such as AI radars, H2S, Gee and Oboe which rapidly eclipsed the German Knickebein system of beams. This was because we had focused upon the defensive use of emerging technology and specifically it's ue in nightfighters. Although the Luftwaffe subsequently exploited our active sysems via Flensberg and Naxos, our window and a huge variety of radar and comms jamming systems gradually crippled their capabilities as the war progressed, especially with the introduction of 100 Gp. Immediately post war, the RAF flew a complex series of trials named 'Post Mortem' against the almost intact Luftwaffe AD system in Denmark jointly manned by RAF and Luftwaffe operators. The results were mute testament to our technological superiority in offensive EW.
Clearly, the night defences remained a significant factor almost to the end, however technologically we led in terms of offensive airborne EW, radar and navigation capabilities. The fact that they lagged because of pre-war focus upon the Luftwaffe being a tactical support arm for the Army was cited by both Galland and Speer as a key factor in this technological failure.
Anyway, we digress...
Regards,
MM
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RAF is Royal Air Force, the name kinda gives it away Air = Airborne assets, since when did the Navy and The Army have the right to own airborne assets and now dictate that we should be binned and merged within them 2.
Its common knowledge now that Air Power is they key, once you gain that then you can send your ground and ship borne troops in. You need a well structured command and it takes many years of training for this to be of use. Soon as you change things especially a huge change like this then it will effectively reduce the capability of the airborne assets for years.
In this day and age with god knows how many airborne assets you will encounter , yes you can see reason we dont need the RAF, But if the likes of Iran,China North Korea and even Russia raise there fists believe me we will need the best air power we have, otherwise we will have to rely on Uncle Sam once again.
Its common knowledge now that Air Power is they key, once you gain that then you can send your ground and ship borne troops in. You need a well structured command and it takes many years of training for this to be of use. Soon as you change things especially a huge change like this then it will effectively reduce the capability of the airborne assets for years.
In this day and age with god knows how many airborne assets you will encounter , yes you can see reason we dont need the RAF, But if the likes of Iran,China North Korea and even Russia raise there fists believe me we will need the best air power we have, otherwise we will have to rely on Uncle Sam once again.
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Thanks for some thoughtful and enlightening responses, gentlemen - particularly from M. Mushroom.
I feel my debating capability has been considerably enhanced.
I feel my debating capability has been considerably enhanced.
