In all the discusion about an MAA (and it may have been covered in the papers alluded to), one of the problems I see needing to be dealt with is the operational aspect. Even as it stands, as things progress towards the RTSA safety case, if something isn't "liked" for operational reasons, justification (however sketchy one may feel) can be made for doing what is "operationally necessary". What would having an an MAA add in this sense? If ACAS wants to sign off an RTS that says "Go do x, regardless of the risk, because the consequences of not doing are ...", I can't see an MAA getting in his way.
What I think is needed is better regulation within the framework that exists, and that includes a better understanding of what it all means by those responsible and honesty in presenting info / taking decisions, such that the crock of Sh!t doesn't become policy.
sw
Last edited by Safeware; 18th Nov 2007 at 22:13.
Reason: making sense of the first sentence :)