Furthermore TD, changes to AAR procedures failed to prevent subsequent massive fuel migrations during AAR Ops and such was overriding Op Tempo AAR Ops were authorised hours after the crash.
I agree with you, the lack of bomb bay fire suppressant is the key here.
I would add, that contrary to what some people have written in this thread it is perfectly possible to provide bomb bay fire protection on Nimrod, for normal ops.
The fact that RAF changed AAR procedures in an attempt to reduce the possibility of pressure spikes during AAR and also restricted the use of certain fuel tanks on board, speaks for itself.
The counter argument for not fitting fuel tank protection to C130s was the absence of official requests making their way up the CoC.
TD has discovered that BAe, no less, requested that Nimrod be given bomb bay fire protection. This is hugely significant.
An explanation needs to be given in the BoI for the rush to continue AAR and the failure to provide adequate bomb bay protection and fuel tank protection.