Four, not one, pilot errors occurred, as follows:
Error one - selected park brake on instead of flap.
Error two - failed to check that the selected flap position was actually achieved after selection.
Error three - after PF requested a repeat of the selection, failed to ask himself what he had actually selected previously if it wasn't flap.
Error four - if the Captain was so concerned about landing conditions at Leeds, he should have elected himself as PF for that sector. Basic command error.
One eror is unfortunate, two errors are careless, but
four errors?
Wasn't "management", was he?
Bet if you gave me the pilots name he'd be on my list of "accidents waiting to happen". Unless he was someone I hadn't flown with before I left the sinking ship. Interesting how I have a much shorter list in my current airline.
The solution starts with the pilot selection process, of course. The whole sorry can of worms opens up, though, when you look at that.
The operator even called in a psychologist to help them with this aspect.
That wouldn't be the self proclaimed (delusional?) Appollo astronaut, Space Shuttle pilot, "consultant to every major aviation issue in the last twenty years" and "ace airliner pilot after two sim rides" would it? God help you.
In fairness, the psychologist comments (as far as quoted in the report) seem to be sensible (can't be the same bloke, then!). They are also extremely obvious. Wonder if I could get a job doing stating the obvious as a sideline? Easy money!
Watch this space. More like it to come, IMHO. (and don't anybody mention the Kegworth crash, emergency landing Luton without any oil in either engine, F27 crash EMA, attempting to fly LHR to MME with only a fraction of the required fuel, taking off with gear pins in, trying to take off from a taxyway or severe damage by hailstones which other operators avoided, to name but a few).