NTSB 6120 Narrative - Aircraft Accident N550XL
1. As the above is now a matter of public record it is copied to this forum:
"The company has a policy and standard operating procedure (SOP) for all solo operations that "touch and go's" are not permitted.
Additionally for Student pilots undergoing solo flight the following additional limitations are endorsed:
Max. Wind: 12 knots
Max Crosswind: 06 knots
Visibility: 5 s.m.
Ceiling: 2,000 feet
The day prior to the accident the Student achieved solo status and pre-solo training requirements under FAA FAR Part 61. The required endorsements were made to his Student Pilot Certificate and logbook including the limiting SOP's. The student was briefed prior to the first solo flight that he was to make only one circuit of the traffic pattern and land to a full stop. He executed this flight successfully and without problem.
During the post first solo de-briefing the Student Pilot was informed of the limitations applicable to his solo operation of the aircraft and specifically that "touch and go's" were prohibited.
A second solo flight that followed a dual training flight was carried out later that day. During this flight the Student Pilot was observed executing "touch and go's". Post this flight the Student was debriefed by both the instructor that authorized his initial solo and the instructor who conducted the flight immediately prior. He was reminded of the limitations applicable to his solo authorization and told in no uncertain terms that "touch and go's" were prohibited.
On the day of the accident, the Student Pilot was executing his third solo flight following a successful dual training flight during which go-arounds were again practiced. The first landing was made to a full stop and a taxi back executed. During the second circuit ATC broadcast a report, two possibly three times, that winds were gusting to 14 knots. The student pilot executed a touch and go on his next landing and the tower questioned his actions, he apologized.
During the third approach to landing, the Student Pilot executed a go-around, during which the aircraft was observed to climbing poorly and appeared to be at a slow airspeed. During the go-around the aircraft started to traverse to the left heading directly towards the VOR and VHF antenna installation. Shortly before collision with the VOR and VHF antenna installation the aircraft was observed to abruptly pitch up whereupon it commenced to yaw and roll to the left. The aircraft then stalled, hit the ground suffering severe structural damage after which a fire started and destroyed the aircraft. The Student Pilot exited the aircraft unaided but after the fire had started.
Post accident examination of the accident site and aircraft confirmed that the engine was operating at a high or full power setting evidenced by the multiple propeller strike marks on the ground and the wing flaps were at 30 degrees (full-flap) at the time of impact.
2. The Pilot
Our understanding is that the pilot is continuing to make good progress in recovery from his post accident injuries having been listed as “critical and unstable” at the time of admission to hospital. All at OBA wish him a speedy and full recovery and our thoughts are with him.
3. NPPL Training
OBA does not conduct training for the NPPL and never have. Any issues with prior JAA flying training being acceptable for credit towards an NPPL are a matter for the FTO executing the training for the NPPL, the CAA and nothing to do with OBA.
4. Posts by Andy Nichols
We are very sorry that you did not complete your JAA PPL Completion training on the Piper PA28 (not Liberty XL2) with us post the flying you had completed in the UK.
You are aware that this resulted from you being unable to be authorised to execute your Qualifying Cross Country (Q X/C) flight due the metrological conditions being outside the safety limits that OBA very sensibly impose on student pilots.
You were only with us for 10 days as I recall to attempt to complete your JAA PPL.
Given the circumstances of this accident it appears that the OBA student pilot operational limitations are there for good reason, safety!
I am very glad we did not allow you to “push us” to authorise you to fly outside our student pilot limitations as it is self evident that there is good reason why we have them.
Given your behaviour since your return to the UK post your unsuccessful course completion (due to weather) I can only imagine what we would have been dealing with had we allowed to you fly when conditions were not within OBA limitations and you had had a similar situation to the one above.
You are also aware that you could not execute training for a JAA Night Qualification until all the requirements of the JAA PPL syllabus were completed, including the QXC flight. (See CAA LASORS for reference).
The friend who accompanied you for training for an IMC rating did successfully complete his course and has never to my knowledge ever posted on this or any other pilot forum.
As far as I am aware all matters between us are resolved so quite why you take every opportunity to post negative information on OBA and comment on the operations of the Liberty XL2 (an aircraft you have never flown) is a mystery.
5. Posts by JABI
I have no idea who “JABI” is (maybe he/she will publicly identify themselves here on this post, possible but unlikely!) but having researched his/her posts they almost exclusively focus on U.S. FTO’s, accidents and absolutely anything negative that can be found with U.S. flying training, I suspect without any first hand knowledge.
Clearly “JABI” is motivated by something other than “balanced, constructive and truthful” comment as evidenced by the “mathematical” comparison of C150 and Liberty XL2 accident statistics, where the "few" Liberty XL2's operating are virtually all used in a heavily utilized training environment and the large number of C150’s are used in a variety of different theaters of operation, from minimal private owner operation to flying schools. I also strongly suspect that more than half of the C150’s registered are not even in an operational condition and never fly.
Any aircraft that is operated exclusively in a training environment will have a far higher accident/incident rate that one which is not or, has a broad mix of operational environment. The Robinson R22 is a prime example of this situation as due to its use in a primary training role, its accident and incident rate was statistically extremely high, did it make it unsafe NO, it was the role in which it was used that caused the statistics.
PPRuNers can draw there own conclusions on “JABI” posts.
6. Aircraft Accidents
Anyone who engages in general aviation flying whether as a pilot or passenger must surely realise that this is classed as a “hazardous pursuit” as is Skiing, Parachuting, Mountain Climbing, Motor Car Racing/Rallying etc. and that engaging in these pursuits has inherent risk to be exposed to bodily injury or death.
Aviation accidents attract huge media speculation and publicity, it sells their publications/television and therefore their advertising.
Fortunately aircraft accidents are a rare occurrence unlike the literally thousands of fatal car accidents that occur each day and therefore attract little or no media “hype”.
Additionally there is always speculation in aircraft accidents generally that they occur due to technical issues or mechanical failure, in reality the vast majority are caused by human (Pilot) error.
You never hear this type of speculation in car accidents e.g. when someone “rear ends” another car - “The Department of Transport are investing possible brake failure as the cause of the accident and resultant fatality”, no it is just that the person who hit you was traveling too close and too fast to stop!
Neither do we ever hear that Hertz or Avis, the owner of the vehicle involved were asked for information on the accident and replied “no comment”!
7. The Liberty XL2
Some on this posting have commented as to the suitability of the Liberty XL2 in a training role, most of the negative comment comes from individuals who have no knowledge of the aircraft and have never flown it or in it. Draw your own conclusions here.
Does the XL2 have its own specific handling characteristics, YES! Does it handle like a C150/PA28/AA5 – NO, it is a different aircraft!
Do XL2/C150/PA28/AA5 aircraft types have there own idiosyncrasies, yes of course they do, but given training in the type this is no problem to any competent individual provided they operate the aircraft as trained and comply with its/their limitations.
Incidentally the Liberty XL2 achieved full certification in Europe with EASA earlier this year (another factual error in this posting correted).
8. OBA Operational Limitations
OBA has been training pilots in a primary role since 1991. Over the years we have experienced almost every issue imaginable, new ones do surface from time to time and we would naïve to believe otherwise.
We closely monitor all flying training and PIC flying and impose strict limits on pilot operation of our aircraft, often to our detriment both financially and from the negative
PR generated as a result when individuals think they are capable of flying under conditions outside our operational limits which are:
OBA policy and standard operating procedure (SOP) for all solo operations no"touch and go's".
Additionally for Student pilots undergoing solo flight the following additional limitations are endorsed:
Max. Wind: 12 knots
Max Crosswind: 06 knots
Visibility:5 s.m.
Ceiling: 2,000 feet
We impose these limits for good reason,
SAFETY.
In the Dirty Harry film Clint Eastwood said “It is a good man who knows his limitations” regrettably some pilots do not know their limitations are often over confident and reckless generally.
When a pilot is flying solo an instructor cannot be present to "hold your hand" and stop you getting into trouble by operating in conditions outside your abilities or "catch" your mistakes. This why OBA impose limitations on solo and PIC operations. Regrettably some pilots do not comply with these limits or “push” to be excluded from them.
The results of this kind of behaviour speak for themselves.
Regards,
Adrian Thompson
President OBA