Once again, It would be interested to hear from more ATC insiders on this..
The Spanish and a number of ATC worldwide systems ( and all of us ) could learn from the Australians.
The language issue is merely one link in the chain.
The latent deficiencies in the system need to be identified. Do you agree ?
The rate of accidents is low but air traffic is growing.
The Australian bureau of Air Safety Investigation carried out the study of the safety of the their ATS system(1991-2 )
They used the Reason model as a conceptual basis for the investigation.
The Reason model is needed in Spain to be applied to ATS, too in my humble opinion but I only have a few pieces of the puzzle.
Reason's model applied to the ATC system involves Error management, organizational deficiencies ( line management decisions ), psychological precursors to unsafe acts (excessive workload, poor human-system interface, working overtime, disturbed sleep patternsetc. ), inadequate defences, acceptance of distractions in the workplace( many incidents have controllers distracted prior to the occurence.
Sonnedoc has confirmed some of these...
What about failure to maintain the traffic picture (SA ) ?
Changes included the establishment of a Strategic Planning unit, upgrading and strengthening of the Quality assurance function, the introduction of a Human Factors training and the use of the Reason model in ATS occurence investigation and safety.
Inadequate defences were identified:
1. Controller must act as own safety net
2. Aircrew role not identified/understood
3. Inadequate monitoring
4. System has few failsafes
5. Collision avoidance not planned
6. Development of an integrated approach to training
7 Clarification of safety versus trade off,etc
What about the inappropiate use of flexibility to very procedures ?
Providing service without checking outcomes ?
Coordination failures ?
From the book,
" Beyond Aviation Human Factors " Maurino,Reason,Johnston and Lee