Almost exactly 20 years ago I was packed off to a meeting in Empress State. The annual SAR policy beano. Rafts of RAF people, a token civvy representing the Senior Service (who had more SAR capable a/c, but we won’t go there).
Routine stuff – CSAR progress (excellent, first batch ready for conversion!!), role limited a/c, not enough kit, etc etc. Then Chair announces that he’s been told to allow a guest 5 minutes to present an idea. In walks a very youthful looking beancounter. Puts up a map that looks like it’s been nicked from Mr M. Fish of the BBC (same year – think about it) with all RAF SAR stations highlighted. States that Wessex can fly XX miles out and XX back on a full fuel load, and flips down an overlay with XX radius circles around each station. “Where there is overlap, we’re closing down one of the stations. Thank you for your time”.
To be fair, the RAF got in first, but most were simply silently aghast at the brain numbing stupidity. “Time on task” was the cry. A few shouts for “night capability”. Then someone mentioned a Sea King could fly further. Wrong thing to say. Compounded by, “What about the Navy stations?” Wrong again. He hadn’t the slightest clue that the RN did SAR, or that we had Sea Kings. His eyes lit up, and he went away to re-draw his little chart, count more beans and shut more stations. (Gannet made a big difference).
You know the rest. No CSAR to speak of. Decimated SAR capability. I happen to be on the retention side of the fence. I’m no expert, but I imagine CSAR requires more intensive training and experience than “normal” SAR, and that experience, training and general sustainability must come from somewhere. I may be wrong there, but I relate this to highlight none of these decisions are capability or duty of care based – purely financial. Dreamt up at a surprising low level with no appreciation whatsoever of the practical impact.