Role of Air Power in Counter-Insurgency operations
If we care to analyse one COIN campaign in which the UK prevailed, the greatest contribution made by air power to defeating the communist insurgents in Malaya (1948-1960) was through a coordinated psyops campaign. Leaflet dropping and voice broadcasts encouraged several thousand insurgents to 'self renew' (the term for surrender); in contrast the kinetic campaign probably killed no more than c 100 CT, for the expenditure of c 36,000 tons or ordnance. RAND conducted a study in the mid 1960s (with access to Air Ministry reports and FEOR(Air) material) and concluded that offensive action had only asupporting role in defeating insurgency - which, strictly sp[eaking, was a civil-lead police campaign.
I hear you all calling that times have changed, weapons are more accurate (are they, really?) etc etc, but as one who has professionally studied Malaya (and other conflicts) there is resonance of this campaign with current operations.
Some useful references include: Malcolm R Postgate: Operation Firedog: Air Support in the Malayan Emergency 1948 – 1960, London, HMSO 1992; Lucien W. Pye: Guerrilla Communism in Malaya: Its social and political meaning. Princeton: 1956; Archie Derry Emergency in Malaya: The Psychological Dimension. (UK) Joint Staff College, 1982. If you are really interested in more detailed materialm PM me - I have a plethora of material (official and published) on this subject.