Is UK Airpower actually useful against insurgents?
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Is UK Airpower actually useful against insurgents?
UK airpower from all 3 Services has been in Iraq/Afghanistan since 2001, and its effectiveness has varied from the fantastic to the 'utterly useless'. My question to the forum is:
'how can we use airpower in a better way against insurgents?'
Do we need more money, better technology or do we just need to be smarter in its application? Is it a unwinnable fight?
Although not a rumour, some real debate on the issue would be interesting.
DH
'how can we use airpower in a better way against insurgents?'
Do we need more money, better technology or do we just need to be smarter in its application? Is it a unwinnable fight?
Although not a rumour, some real debate on the issue would be interesting.
DH
'how can we use airpower in a better way against insurgents?'
The perception amongst many in the 'stan was that a CH-47 was nothing more than a flying 4-tonne truck - and that from the same organisation that labelled us utterly utterly useless.
Educate the people that use airpower and benefit from airpower and I think you will see a lot of the (alleged) problems currently associated with airpower will disappear. That said, CO 3 Para was an absolute star in that respect and totally understood air power and what exactly it would mean if we lost just one of the flying 4 tonne trucks .... if we only had more with his level of understanding in the higher reaches of the army food chain.
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By UK Airpower,are you indicating attack assets alone or including SH as well?
In the case of attack assets I'm pretty sure that, at least in 'stan',the insurgents would love to see the back of the GR7/9's and AH64's.
The problem with insurgents is their ideals and commitment to their cause,although airpower is,in some cases, going to get you out of a sticky situation, it is a quick fix. In the long term they will regroup and keep coming back at you.
In the case of attack assets I'm pretty sure that, at least in 'stan',the insurgents would love to see the back of the GR7/9's and AH64's.
The problem with insurgents is their ideals and commitment to their cause,although airpower is,in some cases, going to get you out of a sticky situation, it is a quick fix. In the long term they will regroup and keep coming back at you.
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Albeit I'm watching this from a civvie's point of view, but could we be sucked into the same trap that the Russians did?
Or are we doing enought to avoid histories lessons?
Or are we doing enought to avoid histories lessons?
Is it a unwinnable fight?
It is the political will or lack of that will determine the outcome of both Afghanistan and Iraq. The military part of the equation is far simpler than resolving the political and religious differences within the two countries.
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[QUOTE]By UK Airpower,are you indicating attack assets alone or including SH as well?QUOTE]
There is the nub of why there is a missunderstanding amongst many in the land environment about air power - many perceive it to be 'just' CAS (ie the woosh bang bit they can see/hear/feel). What the air environment needs to do is highlight that CAS is but one part of air power (I know that this may well be news to the Harrier community).
ISTAR is essential in effectively utilising assets to attrit the insurgents (Predator and Nimrod are play key roles here)
SH are doing a stirling job.
Even the much maligned AT Fleet is part of the overall contribution - LAND forces and their materiel have to get to theatre(s) and it takes a long time to go by boat to the nearest port then drive!
There is the nub of why there is a missunderstanding amongst many in the land environment about air power - many perceive it to be 'just' CAS (ie the woosh bang bit they can see/hear/feel). What the air environment needs to do is highlight that CAS is but one part of air power (I know that this may well be news to the Harrier community).
ISTAR is essential in effectively utilising assets to attrit the insurgents (Predator and Nimrod are play key roles here)
SH are doing a stirling job.
Even the much maligned AT Fleet is part of the overall contribution - LAND forces and their materiel have to get to theatre(s) and it takes a long time to go by boat to the nearest port then drive!
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The FEB issue of Aircraft Illustrated gives a good insight to those of us not in the forces of the various roles and missions being undertaken by airpower out in Afghanistan. By all accounts the Apache is a fantastic piece of kit.
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RE: It is the political will or lack of that will determine the outcome of both Afghanistan and Iraq.
SASLESS - well said that man. Without the 'will' we will never manage to oust what seems to be the never ending insurgency groups.
We all know that the boys 'in theatre' have a daunting task without sufficient resources. Perhaps, if we had the same manning + equipment levels that we had 20 years ago, only with todays capabilities, we could address the synergy of the insurgents more effectively. (a different thread)
So yes, maybe we do need more resources to complete the task...but from where, and for how long. Most importantly, when would our utterly professional but stretched, undervalued and limited resources be allowed to come home on a permanent basis?
I'm sure that the 'delivery' boys/girls (delivering airpower that is) find it equally frustrating that they cannot be ubiquitous in theatre(s) and support everyone and everything (be that SH, AH, AT, CAS, AI, TAL + not forgetting ISTAR). Also, that their superb effort falls on deaf ears or is misunderstood by those they are supporting.
Maybe, just maybe, our masters will prioritise a theatre, get the job done in its entirety, before choosing to dip their toes into something else we might not be able to focus upon completely.
DH - You ask some good questions but I think you already know the answers.
We have good 'airpower' equipment/hardware but it could be better with more funding.
We have excellent personnel who are well trained in how to manipulate that equipment/hardware and deliver airpower, but they and their families could be valued more. The constant roulemont of some fleets just one example of the frustrations. (lots of threads to that effect)
The integration between Land and Air seems to be working and there have been several successes recently. But with the limited equipment/manpower resources available, you will only ever be able to achieve a limited amount of success in small pockets of the theatre(s), over a prolonged period?
So.....
1. more money, more kit, more personnel, more integration, more prioritisation, more focus.
2. reduce cutbacks, reduce misunderstanding, reduce the dabbling, reduce the politicising, reduce the griping, and once its done we can reduce the roulemonts and the frustrations of the many.
head down awaiting incoming!
SA
SASLESS - well said that man. Without the 'will' we will never manage to oust what seems to be the never ending insurgency groups.
We all know that the boys 'in theatre' have a daunting task without sufficient resources. Perhaps, if we had the same manning + equipment levels that we had 20 years ago, only with todays capabilities, we could address the synergy of the insurgents more effectively. (a different thread)
So yes, maybe we do need more resources to complete the task...but from where, and for how long. Most importantly, when would our utterly professional but stretched, undervalued and limited resources be allowed to come home on a permanent basis?
I'm sure that the 'delivery' boys/girls (delivering airpower that is) find it equally frustrating that they cannot be ubiquitous in theatre(s) and support everyone and everything (be that SH, AH, AT, CAS, AI, TAL + not forgetting ISTAR). Also, that their superb effort falls on deaf ears or is misunderstood by those they are supporting.
Maybe, just maybe, our masters will prioritise a theatre, get the job done in its entirety, before choosing to dip their toes into something else we might not be able to focus upon completely.
DH - You ask some good questions but I think you already know the answers.
We have good 'airpower' equipment/hardware but it could be better with more funding.
We have excellent personnel who are well trained in how to manipulate that equipment/hardware and deliver airpower, but they and their families could be valued more. The constant roulemont of some fleets just one example of the frustrations. (lots of threads to that effect)
The integration between Land and Air seems to be working and there have been several successes recently. But with the limited equipment/manpower resources available, you will only ever be able to achieve a limited amount of success in small pockets of the theatre(s), over a prolonged period?
So.....
1. more money, more kit, more personnel, more integration, more prioritisation, more focus.
2. reduce cutbacks, reduce misunderstanding, reduce the dabbling, reduce the politicising, reduce the griping, and once its done we can reduce the roulemonts and the frustrations of the many.
head down awaiting incoming!
SA
Below the Glidepath - not correcting
Is UK Airpower actually useful against insurgents?
In regards to insurgents specifically, we are simply dealing with the symptom, not the cause. It's analogous to treating a ruptured Aorta by applying band-aids to where the blood appears. But the Aorta repair requires much more moral fibre and resolve than either George or Tony's lot has ever displayed. Would Airpower have worked down the Falls or Shankhill Road?
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Role of Air Power in Counter-Insurgency operations
If we care to analyse one COIN campaign in which the UK prevailed, the greatest contribution made by air power to defeating the communist insurgents in Malaya (1948-1960) was through a coordinated psyops campaign. Leaflet dropping and voice broadcasts encouraged several thousand insurgents to 'self renew' (the term for surrender); in contrast the kinetic campaign probably killed no more than c 100 CT, for the expenditure of c 36,000 tons or ordnance. RAND conducted a study in the mid 1960s (with access to Air Ministry reports and FEOR(Air) material) and concluded that offensive action had only asupporting role in defeating insurgency - which, strictly sp[eaking, was a civil-lead police campaign.
I hear you all calling that times have changed, weapons are more accurate (are they, really?) etc etc, but as one who has professionally studied Malaya (and other conflicts) there is resonance of this campaign with current operations.
Some useful references include: Malcolm R Postgate: Operation Firedog: Air Support in the Malayan Emergency 1948 – 1960, London, HMSO 1992; Lucien W. Pye: Guerrilla Communism in Malaya: Its social and political meaning. Princeton: 1956; Archie Derry Emergency in Malaya: The Psychological Dimension. (UK) Joint Staff College, 1982. If you are really interested in more detailed materialm PM me - I have a plethora of material (official and published) on this subject.
I hear you all calling that times have changed, weapons are more accurate (are they, really?) etc etc, but as one who has professionally studied Malaya (and other conflicts) there is resonance of this campaign with current operations.
Some useful references include: Malcolm R Postgate: Operation Firedog: Air Support in the Malayan Emergency 1948 – 1960, London, HMSO 1992; Lucien W. Pye: Guerrilla Communism in Malaya: Its social and political meaning. Princeton: 1956; Archie Derry Emergency in Malaya: The Psychological Dimension. (UK) Joint Staff College, 1982. If you are really interested in more detailed materialm PM me - I have a plethora of material (official and published) on this subject.
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Two's In
The simple answer to that one is yes it did; but - referring to my previous post on this thread - not the delivery of kenetic weapons but in the ISTAR role. Heli-tele was frequently deployed and used to assist in the direction forces on the ground.
Now if the question is could 'air power do it alone?' the answer is no. Mind you no-one argues that it could. Even the use of air policing over Iraq between the wars relied on the use of ground forces - the strength of air power was that it could reduce the number of ground forces required because those that remained could be used effectively.
Would Airpower have worked down the Falls or Shankhill Road?
Now if the question is could 'air power do it alone?' the answer is no. Mind you no-one argues that it could. Even the use of air policing over Iraq between the wars relied on the use of ground forces - the strength of air power was that it could reduce the number of ground forces required because those that remained could be used effectively.
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unfortunatley most our airpower since the end of the 1960's was configured to fight on the west german plain. Very little consideration was made to deploying assets a long way from home and with limited infrasturucture. In the design requirements abilities like able to operate in hot/hig enviroments was left out of specification as it added unnecessary expense ( would also sugest limited export options as well).
Its beem sugested that some additional elements would be useful in Afghanistan and I would sugest Iraq and probably FRY an stol fixed wing aircraft with the capicity between the CH47 and the C130 like the CN239/Cn295/C27J which would take alot of the strain of the ch47 fleet.
Since the 80's we were meant to develop an airmobile brigade but that appears to have been set up to run short but frequent hops hence the lack of airframes.
The Helecopters and some of the tactics developed in Northern Ireland have matured well and i believe we had a head start over our allies. The integration of Apache has been good.
However we still need to maintain a balance Eurofighter and Nimrod are still needd in the inventory Nimrod is actually proving an interesting force multiplier.
We do need to look at the airframes we operate and the specification for their replacements and invest the money in aircraft that can work over large areas of the planet not just where we have been fighting wars but areas where we may have to go for one reason or another. I do beleive that the transport side of the RAF/FAA both roary and fixed wing needs to expand and devlop different levels.
Its beem sugested that some additional elements would be useful in Afghanistan and I would sugest Iraq and probably FRY an stol fixed wing aircraft with the capicity between the CH47 and the C130 like the CN239/Cn295/C27J which would take alot of the strain of the ch47 fleet.
Since the 80's we were meant to develop an airmobile brigade but that appears to have been set up to run short but frequent hops hence the lack of airframes.
The Helecopters and some of the tactics developed in Northern Ireland have matured well and i believe we had a head start over our allies. The integration of Apache has been good.
However we still need to maintain a balance Eurofighter and Nimrod are still needd in the inventory Nimrod is actually proving an interesting force multiplier.
We do need to look at the airframes we operate and the specification for their replacements and invest the money in aircraft that can work over large areas of the planet not just where we have been fighting wars but areas where we may have to go for one reason or another. I do beleive that the transport side of the RAF/FAA both roary and fixed wing needs to expand and devlop different levels.
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To answer that question, you would have to ask the Taliban. I suggest if you want to canvass opinion in Sangin, you'll have to do it when there isn't an Apache overhead. They seem to want to get under cover when they are there.
You could ask the West Side Boys, even in their drug fuelled minds, they feared the Harrier above all else.
You could as the Somali Warlords, they may have knocked a couple of Blackhawks out of the low hover, but I don't think they were very keen on the AC130...at all!
You could ask the VC what they thought of the Huey Gunships, or the USAF/USN napalm drops.
Just a few thoughts....
You could ask the West Side Boys, even in their drug fuelled minds, they feared the Harrier above all else.
You could as the Somali Warlords, they may have knocked a couple of Blackhawks out of the low hover, but I don't think they were very keen on the AC130...at all!
You could ask the VC what they thought of the Huey Gunships, or the USAF/USN napalm drops.
Just a few thoughts....
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Airpower is doing an awesome job in Afghanistan, sometimes there isn't enough of it but it is there to provide support to the guys on the ground. During last summer airpower definitely pulled things back from the brink, but unless you can have airpower overhead everywhere 24-7, cued by some all seeing ISTAR, it isn't going to win the war. Also, from the British perspective, what we have is very stretched but it is doing a brillinat job.
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Well, having flown close to the Iraq/Iran and Afghanistan/Pakistan "borders", and seen the non-existant barriers, it is obvious to me that until they are made secure against insurgency movement (which will never happen), no amount of military power, whether it is ground or air borne, will ever be effective.
At the moment we haven't even worked out the limits of the playing field and, even if we do know where the field extends beyond our lawful footprint, we don't have permission to send our team there.
We have no chance.
At the moment we haven't even worked out the limits of the playing field and, even if we do know where the field extends beyond our lawful footprint, we don't have permission to send our team there.
We have no chance.
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This sounds like a good Staff College essay for someone. Bottom line is that no insurgency has been truly defeated by kinetic activity, regardless of which component delivered it.
I find the term "airpower" too broad - what exactly is meant by airpower? Which bit? If you mean anything that flies, then that is not helpful, as there are a wide range of capabilities under that banner. Strategic air is very different to the battlefield helicopter; and it was not airpower 'doing' ISTAR down the Falls Road - it was Army Aviation with heli teli. In my experience, there are elements in the light blue who tend to lump anything that flies under the 'airpower' banner, which is not doctrinally correct. AP3000 is all about the strategic level - AT, AAR, CAS, AI, OCA, DCA - and any time SH are mentioned it is (a) very brief and (b) in support of the land component.
I don't think we can answer the original question without defining which bit we mean. GR7 and BH in AFG are certainly doing their bit, what more could they do? They will not however win the campaign on their own; that is why we have to have boots on the ground as part of a wider, civil-led campaign. Thompson's principles from Malaya are still valid, and the contribution of the air component to success in Malaya is well made by Cumbrian Fell.
I find the term "airpower" too broad - what exactly is meant by airpower? Which bit? If you mean anything that flies, then that is not helpful, as there are a wide range of capabilities under that banner. Strategic air is very different to the battlefield helicopter; and it was not airpower 'doing' ISTAR down the Falls Road - it was Army Aviation with heli teli. In my experience, there are elements in the light blue who tend to lump anything that flies under the 'airpower' banner, which is not doctrinally correct. AP3000 is all about the strategic level - AT, AAR, CAS, AI, OCA, DCA - and any time SH are mentioned it is (a) very brief and (b) in support of the land component.
I don't think we can answer the original question without defining which bit we mean. GR7 and BH in AFG are certainly doing their bit, what more could they do? They will not however win the campaign on their own; that is why we have to have boots on the ground as part of a wider, civil-led campaign. Thompson's principles from Malaya are still valid, and the contribution of the air component to success in Malaya is well made by Cumbrian Fell.
