It is difficult to discuss this without justifiable emotion colouring ones perspective.
I have enormous respect and admiration for the RAF crews who went out night after night to strike at Germany (and the American daylight crews also, obviously, but I do not wish to broaden this discussion unnecessarily).
I think it is shameful and disgraceful that no campaign medal was awarded to the survivors in Bomber Command.
But it is equally true that much of the destruction in the latter part of the war - which Dresden has come to symbolise - was not necessary, from a military standpoint - and that this WAS known to the Allied commanders at the time.
It was already clear by then that the strategy of de-housing and demoralising the civilian population of Germany had not, and would not, on its own, lead to a collapse of the regime or its industries.
The Allied Bomber Commanders had, in the eyes of the other services, been given their chance and failed.
No blame can or should attach to those who did their duty unflinchingly and willingly, in good faith, and according to the rules of warfare, whatever the consequences.
The consequences should be laid at the door of those in a position to make the decisions.
And here, again, it is hard to blame Arthur Harris alone - he had been given a mandate by the Air Ministry and the British Government to take the war to the enemy in any way possible - when the air offensive was essentially the only offensive action Britain could take against Germany.
Once the weapon of Bomber Command had reached the level of sophistication and effectiveness that it achieved in 1944 and on, it simply had to be used - it had almost a life and purpose of its own. The public demanded it - although by 1945 there was a growing public unease in Britain about the necessity of using such force. The enormous investment of resources that had gone into Bomber Command simply could not be left unused - it would have been unthinkable at the time.
It would appear that the real problem lay in the inability of the highest commander in the RAF - Portal - to actually exercise his authority and impose the will of SHAEF and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, which was to subordinate the bomber forces to the requirements of the ground commanders - much as had been done in the preparations for D-Day.
But because Harris had achieved such a high level of public support - like Montgomery - Portal simply didn't have the balls to make such an unpopular decision - sacking or restraining Harris.
Even Churchill, in late 1944 and onwards, seems to have been at pains to dissociate himself from the man - and the mission - he had been exhorting to precisely these efforts just a few years earlier.
In summary, then, should Britain (and America) feel guilty about the bombing of Dresden (and other similar targets in 1945?). On balance, yes (in my opinion). But should blame be apportioned solely to Bomber Command and all those who served in it? Absolutely not.
SD