You say, Tarnished, that there are no inconsistencies to be seen through. That we have procured an agile aircraft in an age where smart sensors and agile missiles have largely solved the problem of inferior performance should be evidence enough but I was referring more specifically to the case for the gun in situations where no other suitable weapon could be brought to bear.
In the Falklands in 1985, after the Harriers had departed, only the AD Phantoms could be used in some circumstances against any incursion by ground or seaborne forces. For this reason it was considered important enough to train F4 AD pilots in strafe prior to Falklands tours and yet, according to the minutes posted by ExGrunt, it was in 1985 that:
10. As for air-to-ground combat, it is worth noting that the original European Staff Requirement, signed by the Chiefs of Air Staffs from the partner nations in December 1985, specifies the gun only in an air-to-air role.
I believe a similar quandry now presents itself in the context of the sort of conflict we find ourselves committed to in the ME. If the Army urgently need air power to help supress an insurgency and only an AD asset is immediately available, what use is ASRAAM or AMRAAM?
When promotion exams were necessary for advancement to Flt Lt rank I had to learn that "flexibility is the key to air power". I can only assume that today's air staff officers were all university entrants and became instant Flt Lts.