In respect of applying for airspace changes, see the thread:
PPRuNe Forums » Ground Ops Forums » ATC Issues » IFR departures NOT on a SID.
Whichever side of the fence you sit, now's the time to polish up and prepare constructive and balanced arguments, and having been involved in the process before, I know that you won't achieve anything without a good case presentation.
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niknak, also having been involved in two such 'airspace change' proposals, whilst I'd very much like to agree with your reference to "constructive and balanced arguments" I'm afraid that this whole issue has become such a political football that no matter how constructive and balanced the arguments in favour might be, the CAA (acting on the Direction of the DfT which itself is necessarily a political animal) now attempts the impossible task of trying to please all of the people all of the time whilst also trying to be mindful of the Government's not unreasonable desire to be re-elected.
The result is all too often an inadequate solution to an issue which is primarily one concerning
the safety of the travelling public.
Whilst some/many of the aircraft involved may indeed be mere "...tubes full of drunken holiday makers" as WorkingHard opines, these people have nonetheless paid the airline or tour operator for a ticket and they are entitled to the same level of safety and protection whether they're flying from Birmingham, Bristol, Coventry, Doncaster, East Midlands, Exeter, Gatwick, Heathrow, Manchester, Newcastle, Luton, Norwich, Stansted, Teesside (DTV), etc.
The whole ethos in the UK in regard to this issue is hoplessly out-of-date, utterly confused and patently not delivering an acceptable target level of safety.
The 'protection' of an ATZ - being unchanged in its concept for over 50 years - is non-existant for large public-transport aircraft. The military recognised this shortcoming years ago when the standard MATZ was introduced as applying to all military flights.
The growth of airline operations from many previously minimally-used regional airports in Class G airspace has changed the operational landscape and the speed at which such operations can quite literally mushroom from virtually nothing has left the CAA and its hoplessly inadequate civil-service processes far behind.
The notion that all airspace users have equal rights of access is simply untenable in 21st Century Britain - we do not for example, permit learner drivers or motorcycles below a specified engine capacity to operate on our motorways, neither would we/do we allow the owners and operators of privately-owned trains to run on the national rail network without regulation, integration and control; and the idea that UK airspace can be operated in a similar fashion to for example, yachting and boating in The Solent, whilst ensuring that the travelling public is afforded a safe passage, is just not realistic.
The Government champions the development of regional air services yet fails lamentably to facilitate the necessary safety-orientated infrastructure. What the UK urgently needs is a completely new approach by the Government through the DfT that recognises the need to put the safety of the travelling public (who after all, have the vote...) at the top of the agenda whilst also ensuring that where it's reasonable and practical, others are not unduly restricted. The Flexible Use of Airspace concept embraces this latter issue and offers one way ahead.
Whilst one should not really be emotive or sensationalist about this if - God forbid - we were ever faced in the UK with a midair along the lines of Cerritos* (which admittedly, happened inside CAS albeit Class 'B' but a similar concept to the provision of RAS and RIS in UK Class 'G') we would find that the necessary airspace and ATC measures would be introduced virtually overnight (assuming that is, the Government left anyone responsible, still employed in the CAA and so able to do it).
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(*At approximately 11:40 am PDT on August 31, 1986, a Piper Archer departed Torrance, California, for a VFR flight to Big Bear, California. A flight plan filed, but not activated, with the Hawthorne Flight Service Station showed the proposed route as direct Long Beach to Paradise VOR and then direct to Big Bear at a cruising altitude of 9,500 feet. Radar showed that the Piper turned east toward Paradise after takeoff with the Mode-A transponder [i.e. non altitude reporting] set to the VFR code of # 1200. The pilot did not request ATC assistance or clearance into the TMA. [In 1986, what is now Class B airspace was designated as a TMA.]
Aeromexico 498, a DC9 with 58 passengers and a crew of six, was inbound from Tijuana to Los Angeles (LAX) on an IFR flight plan. Flight 498 reported out of 10,000 feet at 11:46 a.m. and was instructed to contact LAX Approach Control. About one minute later, the flight reported level at 7,000 feet, and at 11:50 approach control asked for a speed reduction to 210 knots, which the crew acknowledged.
At 11:50:46, the controller advised Flight 498 of "Traffic, 10 o'clock, one mile, northbound, altitude unknown." Aeromexico 498 acknowledged the call but did not report the traffic in sight.
However, this was not the Archer target.
At 11:51:04, the flight was cleared down to 6,000 feet.
ATC then noticed that the radar was no longer tracking Flight 498 and after several unsuccessful attempts at radio contact, notified the arrival coordinator that radar and radio contact was lost. At 11:52:09, Flight 498 and the Piper Archer collided over Cerritos at about 6,650 feet. The Archer had inadvertently penetrated the 6,000-foot floor of the TMA without a clearance. The sky was clear with reported visibility of 14 miles. There were no survivors on either aircraft, and 15 people were killed on the ground. Five houses were destroyed and seven others damaged by wreckage or post-impact fire").