Air Cdre S.D. Butler Air Officer ISTAR and Chairman of the No.206 Squadron Association recently wrote the following to Association members.
"Dear Association Member,
It is with considerable regret that, following a major review of aircraft and crew numbers, I wish to inform you that, with effect from 1 April 2005, No.206 Squadron will cease to exist as an operational squadron and will become dormant. You will no doubt be aware of the process covering the withdrawal of a Squadron; however, it might be useful to outline the process as it related to this case. The junior Nimrod Squadron is currently 42 Squadron; however, as the Squadron is not subject to a change of role, type or location, protocol states that it remains in its current form. This brings the decision down to the junior Squadron that will face a change of use, which is currently 120 Squadron. However, in this case, 120 Squadron is one of the few RAF Squadrons that is considered to have "special historical significance" in that its Standard was awarded by the Sovereign, in advance of the normal 25 years of continuous operational service for "exceptional wartime service". Also considered as part of the review was the small squadron concept (essentially placing small squadrons under Squadron leader level Squadron commanders) and utilising an embedded Operational Conversion Unit. In both cases, the advantages were not seen as compelling. Clearly, the closure of 206 Squadron will come as a bitter blow to both serving and ex members of the Squadron; however, you will appreciate that the move is part of a much wider review aimed at configuring the Royal Air Force for the future. I will of course be able to give more detail to Association Members at the next reunion; however, in the interim, please feel free to give me a call should you have any additional questions.
Stu Butler
1) What change of use are 120, 206 and 201 facing that 42 is not?
2) As Archimedes and Impiger intimated, the factors which result in the early award of a Standard should have no bearing on seniority.
3) What on earth is the Association Chairman playing at in implicitely agreeing with the extremely contentious view that No.120 had "exceptional wartime service" (which infers that 206 did not) in a letter to wartime 206 Squadron veterans? The idea that CXX's service in the Battle of the Atlantic was any MORE "outstanding" than 206's is both highly subjective and very offensive to these men, who deserve very much better. CXX did have a brief period when, because they were the only Liberator unit, they did make an outstanding contribution, but equally, for much of the war, they were a standard VLR mob operating from Iceland and Ireland. Tough work, to be sure, but work which allowed the removal of the mid-upper turrets. What does that say about the threat?
4) What action, if any, did this twit take in trying to fight for 206's continued existance, if only as the Nimrod training unit?
5) Why was the 'Small Squadron Concept' dismissed quite so readily, I wonder? It's clear that all three surviving Kipper squadrons deserve to be retained. It's a shame (and perhaps unnecessary) that any of the current Nimrod units should disappear.
To recap the facts:
120 did NOTHING during the Great War, forming as part of the Independent Force but disbanding without leaving the UK. 206 had a distinguished Great War record on the frontline in France.
120 did NOTHING during the interwar period, not reforming until the Summer of '41 (22 months into a 68 month War), and then operated at a very low tempo initially (lack of aircraft). Put another way, 120 were absent for nearly one third of the War - they were almost as late to the Party as the Americans were! By contrast, 206 reformed in June 1936, and flew during the darkest days of the war, with inadequate aircraft which gave their crews little prospect of survival.
206 did their share of the gruelling VLR sorties out into the Atlantic when flying Forts out of the Azores, but also had their moments flying Ansons and Hudsons (and flying Ansons as a frontline type required heroism of a very high order) and flew their Libs out into the Bay of Biscay from St Eval and out to the Norwegian Coast from Leuchars - both areas that were crawling with enemy fighters. 206 attacked a U-Boat on the first day of the war, and lost the first British PoW of the war. Dunkirk? 206 were there. First Coastal unit with ASV radar? 206. D-Day? 206 was there. Arctic Convoys? Ditto. Operating in the Baltic (the enemy's backyard)? Ditto. First with LABS? 206.
206's postwar record has been equally exemplary.
I'm not claiming that No.120 had it 'easy', only that their wartime service was significantly shorter, and therefore worth no more than that of No.206.
For 120 to be retained instead of 206, one would have to assert that No.120 Squadron's 46 months of wartime service were worth much MORE than 206's 68 months (and its Great War and interwar service), thereby compensating for120's shorter accumulated service, and for the fact that it was never operational before June 1941.
I'm not claiming that No.206's WWII record is MORE distinguished than No.120's - only that it is no LESS distinguished, and that seniority should thus be the deciding factor.
And if you must keep 120, then why should 206's numberplate not survive with the OCU? 42 is very junior, by comparison.