AA MD82 Landing Incident?
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AA MD82 Landing Incident?
Any more info on this?
************************************************************ ********************
** Report created 11/22/2004 Record 1 **
************************************************************ ********************
IDENTIFICATION
Regis#: 234AA Make/Model: MD82 Description: MD-81/82/83/87/88
Date: 11/21/2004 Time: 1738
Event Type: Incident Highest Injury: None Mid Air: N Missing: N
Damage: Unknown
LOCATION
City: DENVER State: CO Country: US
DESCRIPTION
N234AA, AMERICAN AIRLINES AAL1115, MD-82 ACFT, LANDED APPROXIMATELY 1000FT
SHORT OF THE RUNWAY NO INJURIES REPORTED AND DAMAGE EXTENT UNKNOWN, DENVER,
CO
INJURY DATA Total Fatal: 0
# Crew: 0 Fat: 0 Ser: 0 Min: 0 Unk:
# Pass: 0 Fat: 0 Ser: 0 Min: 0 Unk:
# Grnd: Fat: 0 Ser: 0 Min: 0 Unk:
WEATHER: 1727Z 31010KT 1/16SM R35L/3000VPC00FT FAFG OVC001 MO3/M04 A3014
************************************************************ ********************
** Report created 11/22/2004 Record 1 **
************************************************************ ********************
IDENTIFICATION
Regis#: 234AA Make/Model: MD82 Description: MD-81/82/83/87/88
Date: 11/21/2004 Time: 1738
Event Type: Incident Highest Injury: None Mid Air: N Missing: N
Damage: Unknown
LOCATION
City: DENVER State: CO Country: US
DESCRIPTION
N234AA, AMERICAN AIRLINES AAL1115, MD-82 ACFT, LANDED APPROXIMATELY 1000FT
SHORT OF THE RUNWAY NO INJURIES REPORTED AND DAMAGE EXTENT UNKNOWN, DENVER,
CO
INJURY DATA Total Fatal: 0
# Crew: 0 Fat: 0 Ser: 0 Min: 0 Unk:
# Pass: 0 Fat: 0 Ser: 0 Min: 0 Unk:
# Grnd: Fat: 0 Ser: 0 Min: 0 Unk:
WEATHER: 1727Z 31010KT 1/16SM R35L/3000VPC00FT FAFG OVC001 MO3/M04 A3014
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and.................DENVER - Investigators with the National Transportation Safety Board are concentrating on the glide slope instrumentation and the pilot operations in their investigation of why an American Airlines Flight landed 350 feet short of the runway at Denver International Airport Sunday morning.
It was snowing, icy and instruments-only when American Airlines Flight 1115 from Dallas landed at DIA. The MD80 would have been on glide slope instrumentation to keep it on the right descent for landing. If the plane is too high or too low, an alarm voice should have sounded in the cockpit. The instrumentation depends on instruments on the ground and in the plane. DIA says its system on the ground was tested after the plane landed and DIA's instrumentation was working. Most of the equipment from the plane has been sent to Washington D.C. for analysis.
The MD80 hit approach lights and landed on a lighter-weight concrete short of the runway.
The First Officer, as opposed to the Captain, was flying the plane. That's considered routine.
Debris from the broken lights and the plane was strewn along the runway for 700 feet. That was a potential problem for other planes that landed after AA Flight 1115 landed. Evidently, the pilots didn't know they'd hit the lights because they didn't report it to DIA operations until about 25 minutes after the accident happened.
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Evidently, the pilots didn't know they'd hit the lights because they didn't report it to DIA operations until about 25 minutes after the accident happened.
Ooops..... sounds strange.
regards
Ooops..... sounds strange.
regards
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As the evidence flows in .......
"AMERICAN AIRLINES AAL1115, MD-82 ACFT, LANDED APPROXIMATELY 1000FT SHORT OF THE RUNWAY"
or .....
"American Airlines Flight landed 350 feet short of the runway"
is it any wonder we all end up going around in circles with some of these incident reports
"AMERICAN AIRLINES AAL1115, MD-82 ACFT, LANDED APPROXIMATELY 1000FT SHORT OF THE RUNWAY"
or .....
"American Airlines Flight landed 350 feet short of the runway"
is it any wonder we all end up going around in circles with some of these incident reports
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Not taking sides, but just for a bit of balance 
there is at least one reasonable explanation for the 25-minute delay, IF they didn't notice anything unusual on landing. From touchdown and rollout, they would have completed their taxi to the gate (slowly, due to the snowy/icy conditions), and shut down. That would have taken several minutes. Then perhaps a marshaller noticed some damage and notified the pilots. Pilots continue shutdown checklist, then go out and check the aircraft. Another several minutes. Then they realize what has happened and start contacting authorities.
there is at least one reasonable explanation for the 25-minute delay, IF they didn't notice anything unusual on landing. From touchdown and rollout, they would have completed their taxi to the gate (slowly, due to the snowy/icy conditions), and shut down. That would have taken several minutes. Then perhaps a marshaller noticed some damage and notified the pilots. Pilots continue shutdown checklist, then go out and check the aircraft. Another several minutes. Then they realize what has happened and start contacting authorities.
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411A,
You're usually best ignored so with that in mind this is for the benefit of open-minded, non AA ax-grinders....
DIA is a huge airport. Taxy time varies but safe to say, given the reduced visiblity at the time, it could take this crew at least the ten minutes it took me when I was there a week ago, on a VFR day.
At the gate, a shutdown checklist takes a few minutes whilst the passengers begin to deplane. It can take up to ten minutes for them all to get off.
At this point in time, assuming this crew and airplane continue to another destination, the CA leaves the airplane to get the paperwork, check WX etc and the FO "sets up" the flight deck per before starting engine checklist. This may account for another five or six minutes.
Finally the FO then leaves the flightdeck to check the outside of the airplane, known as the "walk around".
I was not there but this timeline is somewhat typical for a through flight.
DD
You're usually best ignored so with that in mind this is for the benefit of open-minded, non AA ax-grinders....
DIA is a huge airport. Taxy time varies but safe to say, given the reduced visiblity at the time, it could take this crew at least the ten minutes it took me when I was there a week ago, on a VFR day.
At the gate, a shutdown checklist takes a few minutes whilst the passengers begin to deplane. It can take up to ten minutes for them all to get off.
At this point in time, assuming this crew and airplane continue to another destination, the CA leaves the airplane to get the paperwork, check WX etc and the FO "sets up" the flight deck per before starting engine checklist. This may account for another five or six minutes.
Finally the FO then leaves the flightdeck to check the outside of the airplane, known as the "walk around".
I was not there but this timeline is somewhat typical for a through flight.
DD
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Fresh from the NTSB;
NTSB Identification: DEN05IA027
Scheduled 14 CFR Part 121: Air Carrier operation of CIT Leasing Corp. (D.B.A. American Airlines)
Incident occurred Sunday, November 21, 2004 in Denver, CO
Aircraft: McDonnell Douglas DC-9-82, registration: N234AA
Injuries: 106 Uninjured.
This is preliminary information, subject to change, and may contain errors. Any errors in this report will be corrected when the final report has been completed.
On November 21, 2004, at 1038 mountain standard time, a McDonnell Douglas DC-9-82, N234AA, operating as American Airlines Flight 1115, sustained minor damage when during landing at the Denver International Airport (DEN), Denver, Colorado, the airplane struck several approach and runway threshold lights. Instrument meteorological conditions prevailed at the time of the incident. The scheduled domestic passenger flight was being conducted on an instrument flight rules flight plan under the provisions of Title 14 CFR Part 121. The captain, first officer, 3 flight attendants, and 101 passengers on board reported no injuries. The flight originated at the Dallas-Fort Worth International Airport, Ft. Worth, Texas, at 1004 central standard time, and was en route to DEN.
The captain reported that the first officer was flying the airplane. Approach control vectored the airplane on to a short approach to runway 35L. The airplane overshot the localizer. The first officer was chasing the glide slope. Approach control asked American Airlines Flight 1115 if they wanted to go-around. The captain said that they (the crew) could take the approach. The first officer intercepted the glide slope at 500 to 600 feet above ground level (agl). The captain announced at 100 feet agl that he had the runway environment in sight. The first officer then looked outside and began flying a visual approach. The captain said there was sufficient runway environment in sight. The captain said the first officer did not see the PAPIs (Precision Approach Path Indicator lights). At 50 to 75 feet agl, the first officer "dipped below the glide slope." The audible warning alarm sounded. The captain called for a go-around. The first officer attempted to go-around, but did not advance the throttles in time. The airplane "landed firm" but the crew noticed nothing wrong with the airplane. The crew taxied the airplane to the gate. When they got to the gate they noticed the hydraulic quantity indicator was low, but the pressure was normal.
At 1046, the weather at DEN was 100 broken, 1/2 mile visibility with freezing fog, temperature was 27 degrees Fahrenheit (F), dew point 28 degrees F, winds 320 degrees at 8 knots, altimeter 30.13 inched, and remarks "surface visibility 1/2 mile, visibility north through east 2 mile, ceiling 100 feet broken varies overcast."
The National Transportation Safety Board arrived on scene at 1300.
An examination of runway 35L showed one approach light, 19 feet from the beginning of the paved overrun, broken forward at its base. Approximately 49 feet from the start of the paved overrun surface, the beginning of 2 pairs of parallel-running tire marks were observed. The left pair of tire marks ran through 3 sets of center approach lights in the overrun, 2 runway threshold lights, a distance of 354 feet, and continued down runway 35L for approximately 700 feet. Light stanchions, broken lens pieces, and bulb debris was observed extending down the runway along the tire marks.
An examination of the airplane showed damage to the left main landing gear tire and brake lines, dents and scraped in the bottom left aft fuselage, chips in the aft bottom radio antennae, and cracks and puncture damage to the bottom of the left engine cowling. There was puncture damage to the inside of the left engine cowling, just forward of the stator vanes to the engine's compressor section. Several of the engine's compressor blades showed dents and scrapes. A ground check of the airplane's avionic system revealed no anomalies.
Index for Nov2004 | Index of months
NTSB Identification: DEN05IA027
Scheduled 14 CFR Part 121: Air Carrier operation of CIT Leasing Corp. (D.B.A. American Airlines)
Incident occurred Sunday, November 21, 2004 in Denver, CO
Aircraft: McDonnell Douglas DC-9-82, registration: N234AA
Injuries: 106 Uninjured.
This is preliminary information, subject to change, and may contain errors. Any errors in this report will be corrected when the final report has been completed.
On November 21, 2004, at 1038 mountain standard time, a McDonnell Douglas DC-9-82, N234AA, operating as American Airlines Flight 1115, sustained minor damage when during landing at the Denver International Airport (DEN), Denver, Colorado, the airplane struck several approach and runway threshold lights. Instrument meteorological conditions prevailed at the time of the incident. The scheduled domestic passenger flight was being conducted on an instrument flight rules flight plan under the provisions of Title 14 CFR Part 121. The captain, first officer, 3 flight attendants, and 101 passengers on board reported no injuries. The flight originated at the Dallas-Fort Worth International Airport, Ft. Worth, Texas, at 1004 central standard time, and was en route to DEN.
The captain reported that the first officer was flying the airplane. Approach control vectored the airplane on to a short approach to runway 35L. The airplane overshot the localizer. The first officer was chasing the glide slope. Approach control asked American Airlines Flight 1115 if they wanted to go-around. The captain said that they (the crew) could take the approach. The first officer intercepted the glide slope at 500 to 600 feet above ground level (agl). The captain announced at 100 feet agl that he had the runway environment in sight. The first officer then looked outside and began flying a visual approach. The captain said there was sufficient runway environment in sight. The captain said the first officer did not see the PAPIs (Precision Approach Path Indicator lights). At 50 to 75 feet agl, the first officer "dipped below the glide slope." The audible warning alarm sounded. The captain called for a go-around. The first officer attempted to go-around, but did not advance the throttles in time. The airplane "landed firm" but the crew noticed nothing wrong with the airplane. The crew taxied the airplane to the gate. When they got to the gate they noticed the hydraulic quantity indicator was low, but the pressure was normal.
At 1046, the weather at DEN was 100 broken, 1/2 mile visibility with freezing fog, temperature was 27 degrees Fahrenheit (F), dew point 28 degrees F, winds 320 degrees at 8 knots, altimeter 30.13 inched, and remarks "surface visibility 1/2 mile, visibility north through east 2 mile, ceiling 100 feet broken varies overcast."
The National Transportation Safety Board arrived on scene at 1300.
An examination of runway 35L showed one approach light, 19 feet from the beginning of the paved overrun, broken forward at its base. Approximately 49 feet from the start of the paved overrun surface, the beginning of 2 pairs of parallel-running tire marks were observed. The left pair of tire marks ran through 3 sets of center approach lights in the overrun, 2 runway threshold lights, a distance of 354 feet, and continued down runway 35L for approximately 700 feet. Light stanchions, broken lens pieces, and bulb debris was observed extending down the runway along the tire marks.
An examination of the airplane showed damage to the left main landing gear tire and brake lines, dents and scraped in the bottom left aft fuselage, chips in the aft bottom radio antennae, and cracks and puncture damage to the bottom of the left engine cowling. There was puncture damage to the inside of the left engine cowling, just forward of the stator vanes to the engine's compressor section. Several of the engine's compressor blades showed dents and scrapes. A ground check of the airplane's avionic system revealed no anomalies.
Index for Nov2004 | Index of months
Union Goon
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In CRM class at AA virtually all the incidents discussed were ALWAYS about the "Stupid 80". I suggested we could improve the safety of the airline and shorten the CRM course by simply selling the MD80 fleet.
That was met with a cold stare from the instructor. AA does have 400 or so of them, and they are half of American's fleet, but they are involved in a disproportionate number of incidents.
I have never flown the 80 myself, and those in the 80 program swear by the aircraft. I think its a combination of stockholm syndrome and a cult myself
No actual comment on the indident here, just an amusing story from the school house.
Cheers
Wino
That was met with a cold stare from the instructor. AA does have 400 or so of them, and they are half of American's fleet, but they are involved in a disproportionate number of incidents.
I have never flown the 80 myself, and those in the 80 program swear by the aircraft. I think its a combination of stockholm syndrome and a cult myself
No actual comment on the indident here, just an amusing story from the school house.
Cheers
Wino
You will all come down on me like a ton of bricks but under the prevailing weather conditions, as described by the NTSB I'd say this was poor ATC (poor vectoring onto a short final) and poor airmanship (continuing with an unstable approach). Period. Tin hat on!
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Why are we not surprised...
AA, at it again.
STUPID pilots, plain and simple.
Cali, Colombia. (Bang, hit high terrain due to situational awareness)
Little Rock. (A chief pilot, no less, landing in a thunderstorm)
New York (A300-600, big feet on the rudder)
Seattle. (Landing on the taxiway)
And now Denver.
These folks should be audited for the inability of flight crew to actually fly the aeroplane to a successfull landing...on the runway.
You gotta admit, someting stinks in Dallas...and it ain't the cowboys.
Or, maybe it is... cowboys in the cockpit, AA style.
Now one would/could expect this of, say, an African air carrier, but AA has been around for a very long time.
AA, positively no excuse... period.
Quite frankly, AA should be shut down.
Anyone else here want to make excuses for these turkeys?
STUPID pilots, plain and simple.
Cali, Colombia. (Bang, hit high terrain due to situational awareness)
Little Rock. (A chief pilot, no less, landing in a thunderstorm)
New York (A300-600, big feet on the rudder)
Seattle. (Landing on the taxiway)
And now Denver.
These folks should be audited for the inability of flight crew to actually fly the aeroplane to a successfull landing...on the runway.
You gotta admit, someting stinks in Dallas...and it ain't the cowboys.
Or, maybe it is... cowboys in the cockpit, AA style.
Now one would/could expect this of, say, an African air carrier, but AA has been around for a very long time.
AA, positively no excuse... period.
Quite frankly, AA should be shut down.
Anyone else here want to make excuses for these turkeys?
Initial post on the subject: 23 Nov, 00:05
Reply by 411A: 23 Nov, 00:46
Amazing, any pruner can puruse the archives and find that any subject referencing AA will be met by 411A's venom spitting in less than 2 hours, even before any bodies have been laid to rest (research 411A's glee last year at the deaths of two AA pilots in a private accident, an accident still unresolved by the NTSB). It is plainly obvious that 411A's multiple orgasms at any ill suffered at AA are a result of some deep seated slight from the past, and that have must have involved an AA pilot.
Was his bitter attitude the result of Mrs. 411A seeking comfort from his inadequacies in the arms of an AA pilot who only worked DFW-NRT 9 days a month? Was it an AA pilot with dimished motor skills who ran over a pet Yorkie of his? Was it the perceived wisdom of AA personel who turned down 411A's obvious superior piloting skills when he applied for a job? (This is my favored scenario, I think it was an easy call )
There is one person that can answer this and I doubt we will find out.
If this scum has any redeeming value to the fraternity of aviators, please let me know. I've yet to see anything other than a sad, bitter,vindictive, total POS known as 411A
Sorry about the yahoo chat board imitation, it's just a colonial spat.
Reply by 411A: 23 Nov, 00:46
Amazing, any pruner can puruse the archives and find that any subject referencing AA will be met by 411A's venom spitting in less than 2 hours, even before any bodies have been laid to rest (research 411A's glee last year at the deaths of two AA pilots in a private accident, an accident still unresolved by the NTSB). It is plainly obvious that 411A's multiple orgasms at any ill suffered at AA are a result of some deep seated slight from the past, and that have must have involved an AA pilot.
Was his bitter attitude the result of Mrs. 411A seeking comfort from his inadequacies in the arms of an AA pilot who only worked DFW-NRT 9 days a month? Was it an AA pilot with dimished motor skills who ran over a pet Yorkie of his? Was it the perceived wisdom of AA personel who turned down 411A's obvious superior piloting skills when he applied for a job? (This is my favored scenario, I think it was an easy call
) There is one person that can answer this and I doubt we will find out.
If this scum has any redeeming value to the fraternity of aviators, please let me know. I've yet to see anything other than a sad, bitter,vindictive, total POS known as 411A
Sorry about the yahoo chat board imitation, it's just a colonial spat.
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Ah yes, another AA guy chimes in..
Sorry to disappoint you, WhatsaLizad, but I never worked for AA, nor did I ever apply to do so.
Ask yourself...what US airline has the highest percentage of incidents/accidents over the last ten years.
The unmistakable answer is...American Airlines.
Who, due to the pilots inability to navigate properly, ran into a hill at Cali...American Airlines.
Who, being unable to resist landing in a thunderstorm, crashed at Little Rock....American Airlines. A chicago based Chief Pilot no less....shame. At least HE should have known better.
The record shows the First Officer certainly did.
Who, due to the inability to actually train their pilots properly in regard to the use of the rudder....American Airlines.
And...who landed short at Denver, due to the pilots' inability to actually land properly....American Airlines.
The record, unfortunately, speaks for itself.
AA simply can't do it right....without bending metal.
Just where will it all end?
Now some may think I am being overly critical.
OK then, why has Northwest...or United...or Continental...or Delta not had these very same mishaps where, it appears it well could have been prevented by proper flying techniques.?
Answers on a postcard...please.
American Airlines...doing it wrong.
Ask yourself...what US airline has the highest percentage of incidents/accidents over the last ten years.
The unmistakable answer is...American Airlines.
Who, due to the pilots inability to navigate properly, ran into a hill at Cali...American Airlines.
Who, being unable to resist landing in a thunderstorm, crashed at Little Rock....American Airlines. A chicago based Chief Pilot no less....shame. At least HE should have known better.
The record shows the First Officer certainly did.
Who, due to the inability to actually train their pilots properly in regard to the use of the rudder....American Airlines.
And...who landed short at Denver, due to the pilots' inability to actually land properly....American Airlines.
The record, unfortunately, speaks for itself.
AA simply can't do it right....without bending metal.
Just where will it all end?
Now some may think I am being overly critical.
OK then, why has Northwest...or United...or Continental...or Delta not had these very same mishaps where, it appears it well could have been prevented by proper flying techniques.?
Answers on a postcard...please.
American Airlines...doing it wrong.
Psychophysiological entity
I rarely make comment about an accident, but in this case the read is so odd that I will remark only on the text per se, assuming that the inquiry will make more sense than this text.
Approach control vectored the airplane on to a short approach to runway 35L. The airplane overshot the localizer. The first officer was chasing the glide slope.
This is a bad start to the final landing phase, even in good weather.
'Approach control asked American Airlines Flight 1115 if they wanted to go-around.'
I would say that this was a clue that they were not happy, even if the crew were.
'The captain said that they (the crew) could take the approach.' Please tell me that by now they were in one slot or the other.
'The first officer intercepted the glide slope at 500 to 600 feet above ground level (agl). '
At what rate I wonder. But of course by now nicely settled on the LOC ??
'The captain announced at 100 feet agl that he had the runway environment in sight.' From what angle I wonder.
'The first officer then looked outside and began flying a visual approach.'
So, from circa 80' in cr*p conditions and probably poor positioning, he had plenty of time to transfer to visual then?
'The captain said there was sufficient runway environment in sight.' If that is an exact quote, is this new planespeak? If so, sufficient for what?
'The captain said the first officer did not see the PAPIs (Precision Approach Path Indicator lights).'
So there wasn't quite sufficient ‘runway environment' in sight for both pilots then?
'At 50 to 75 feet agl, the first officer "dipped below the glide slope." The audible warning alarm sounded.'
Go back a few steps to "The first officer was chasing the glide slope" and the imagery becomes vivid at this point.
'The captain called for a go-around. The first officer attempted to go-around, but did not advance the throttles in time.'
So, they both sit there with the little airplanes way into the blue and don't open the taps. Well, this would explain the damage to the ventral regions perhaps
'The airplane "landed firm" but the crew noticed nothing wrong with the airplane.'
Other than it refused to fly with no power. At least the plane made a sensible decision.
Damage to the left this, left that, left the other.... So the wings were not quite level then?
'The crew taxied the airplane to the gate. When they got to the gate they noticed the hydraulic quantity indicator was low, but the pressure was normal. ' = Still squirting out. But as luck would have it, the brakes still worked.
If what we read here is true, this type of flying, sometimes acceptable on a bright clear day, is absolutely not acceptable with this reported weather.
This text may be written in a way that makes everything look bleak for the crew, but I just get a bad feeling about this pre-report. I am routinely flying AA now as SLF, and I want to feel confident that my intrepid colleagues will not be sculling about in poor weather conditions, chasing the ILS while below 1,000'.
Approach control vectored the airplane on to a short approach to runway 35L. The airplane overshot the localizer. The first officer was chasing the glide slope.
This is a bad start to the final landing phase, even in good weather.
'Approach control asked American Airlines Flight 1115 if they wanted to go-around.'
I would say that this was a clue that they were not happy, even if the crew were.
'The captain said that they (the crew) could take the approach.' Please tell me that by now they were in one slot or the other.
'The first officer intercepted the glide slope at 500 to 600 feet above ground level (agl). '
At what rate I wonder. But of course by now nicely settled on the LOC ??
'The captain announced at 100 feet agl that he had the runway environment in sight.' From what angle I wonder.
'The first officer then looked outside and began flying a visual approach.'
So, from circa 80' in cr*p conditions and probably poor positioning, he had plenty of time to transfer to visual then?
'The captain said there was sufficient runway environment in sight.' If that is an exact quote, is this new planespeak? If so, sufficient for what?
'The captain said the first officer did not see the PAPIs (Precision Approach Path Indicator lights).'
So there wasn't quite sufficient ‘runway environment' in sight for both pilots then?
'At 50 to 75 feet agl, the first officer "dipped below the glide slope." The audible warning alarm sounded.'
Go back a few steps to "The first officer was chasing the glide slope" and the imagery becomes vivid at this point.
'The captain called for a go-around. The first officer attempted to go-around, but did not advance the throttles in time.'
So, they both sit there with the little airplanes way into the blue and don't open the taps. Well, this would explain the damage to the ventral regions perhaps
'The airplane "landed firm" but the crew noticed nothing wrong with the airplane.'
Other than it refused to fly with no power. At least the plane made a sensible decision.
Damage to the left this, left that, left the other.... So the wings were not quite level then?
'The crew taxied the airplane to the gate. When they got to the gate they noticed the hydraulic quantity indicator was low, but the pressure was normal. ' = Still squirting out. But as luck would have it, the brakes still worked.
If what we read here is true, this type of flying, sometimes acceptable on a bright clear day, is absolutely not acceptable with this reported weather.
This text may be written in a way that makes everything look bleak for the crew, but I just get a bad feeling about this pre-report. I am routinely flying AA now as SLF, and I want to feel confident that my intrepid colleagues will not be sculling about in poor weather conditions, chasing the ILS while below 1,000'.
ex-Tanker
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Press-on-Itis
The Captain´s report, if it is truely reported, says it all. Now we should learn from the incident.
After all the CRM, SIm training, Line checks, Memos, Quality meetings and discussions, still we get crews pressing on with unstabilised approaches.
Here they got away with it thank God. These guys should now make a tour of operators, explaining to other pilots first hand what thoughts go on in these situations - what makes us press on, even when warning signs are there, loud and clear.
Human psychology seemingly stays constant - unconvinced by rule makers, advisers and instructors. What goes on inside us? Is it the same instinct which makes us try to get to the motorway gas station after this one, rather than doing the guarranteed safe thing?
Let us not hammer these guys - let us learn from them. Let us not, on the other hand label it conveniently CFIT and publish yet more memos.
Let us also agree, that no one airline has a monopoly on press-on-itis.
Each and all need to understand these inner feelings and the individual will have to develop a strategy for dealing with them.
After all the CRM, SIm training, Line checks, Memos, Quality meetings and discussions, still we get crews pressing on with unstabilised approaches.
Here they got away with it thank God. These guys should now make a tour of operators, explaining to other pilots first hand what thoughts go on in these situations - what makes us press on, even when warning signs are there, loud and clear.
Human psychology seemingly stays constant - unconvinced by rule makers, advisers and instructors. What goes on inside us? Is it the same instinct which makes us try to get to the motorway gas station after this one, rather than doing the guarranteed safe thing?
Let us not hammer these guys - let us learn from them. Let us not, on the other hand label it conveniently CFIT and publish yet more memos.
Let us also agree, that no one airline has a monopoly on press-on-itis.
Each and all need to understand these inner feelings and the individual will have to develop a strategy for dealing with them.
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After a particularly ugly approach incident, our airline went to the mandatory 1000’ stable approach criteria, with added emphsis on the "No fault go-around". Other carriers, some voluntary, some not, have done the same. FOQA data show a dramatic reduction in unstabilised approaches. My guess is that we will see AAL go to this standard - perhaps voluntary, perhaps not.
