Guys, remember who the enemy is. Guards and pilots are on the same side in this war!
Lets take this debate back to basics. What we are talking about here is how to counter the threat of terrorist "sleepers" who may try to get jobs reqiring airside access.
The most appropriate means to counter this threat depends on the jobs people do.
First it must be recognised that there are some jobs in which it would be possible to hijack or destroy an aircraft using only the tools nescessary for that job.
The most obvious of these jobs is flight crew. I am legally responsible for a piece of machinery which has the potential to be "the equivilent of a weapon of mass destruction". If I were a terrorist sleeper I could crash a passenger jet on a city center tomorrow morning. If the F/O were not a confederate I would have to take him out, but for a determined terrorist that would not be too difficult even without carrying any "prohibited articles" in a flight bag. There might even be a way I could survive.
Other jobs in this category include firearms authorised police officers and maintainance engineers (for reasons I will not go into).
For such staff, the only defense is vetting: the authorities must obtain the highest possible assurance that these staff are not terrorists. It follows that all staff in this category must be subject to the most rigourous government positive vetting procedures. Perhaps also staff responsible for securing catering supplies and any staff who need to dirve a vehiecle from land to air side and who have access to aircraft (e.g tanker drivers) would also need to be in this category.
For positive vetted staff, there is little marginal value in body searches at validation points since such staff have the means to destroy an aircraft anyway. Putting bags on the x ray machine would still be useful for the owner's own benefit in case it had been tampered with. Valdation point control for positive vetted staff should concentrate on veryfying identity. Technology such as retinal scanning may be useful here.
Full positive vetting is however complex and costly. It can also be politically senstive in relation to equal opportunities legislation.
For ALL other airside staff who are not positive vetted, validation point control must concentrate on search.
In summary, we need a scheme in which the requirement to search staff depends on whether the staff member has positive vetted status. The requirement for positive vetting in turn depends on the job category.