What does needed mean?
If you mean that the Falklands was the only case in the last few decades where carriers and/or organic air defence were critical to the mission, then you are right.
However, both CVS and the Sea Harrier have been useful. In the Adriatic, several 90s stand offs with Iraq, Sierra Leone, and other places. You may well argue the involvement was for political rather than tactical reasons but even if this was the case then surely it was useful in demonstrating the wishes and intentions of HM Government.
One of the arguments in 1982 was that recapturing the Falklands would send a message to other potentially aggressive regimes. It did prove that the UK (and by extension the entire West) was willing to fight if necessary, and to sustain losses. What sort of message is the loss of the Sea Harrier, with all the loss of independent capability that results, and the other cutbacks in HM Forces, sending to potential aggressors?
The future is likely to involve many asymmetric aspects. Does this always exclude the use of aircraft? Against undefended forces, a few MiGs go a long way, particularly against things like landing craft or helicopters. Stump up the cash, and the Russians or Chinese will be happy to sell you some supersonic anti ship missiles to go with them. Thus a few MiGs or Sukhois, can seriously inhibit or restrict operations by larger forces in the opponent's littoral.
Several assumptions would appear to be being made by a lot of people.
1. All conflicts will occur after a period of months, or years, to allow us to study or eliminate his command and control facilities.
2. No enemy will have forces both willing and able to fight and inflict real damage on our forces.
3. No nation which has not been subject to no fly zones, sanctions and the like will be hostile. Not even if there are sudden changes of Government.
4. No enemy would try to use his forces in a coordinated way.
I am not convinced myself. Neither is anyone I have spoken to.
Pr00ne - I've just re-read what you wrote.
The whole point of Exercise Rapid Alliance, like some of the scenarios I have mentioned, is that a number of landings are carried out in different locations that may be several hundred miles away from each other. As such it is highly desirable for each task group to have its own dedicated air defence. Particularly when the nearest friendly forces are a lot further away than the enemy airfields.
Without it....see my above comments.
A few MiGs could effectively defeat a force of several large (LPH/LPD etc) ships, many helicopters and hundred or thousands of troops by making their use too risky for these risk averse times.
In 1991 thousands of Iraqi troops, with supporting tanks etc, were commited to defending Kuwaiti beaches from an amphibious assault. There were minefields laid off of the coast. To make the threat real, the mines had to be cleared. Minesweeping and minehunting operations could only commence once air superiority/supremacy had been achieved and the Iraqi surface fleet had been eliminated.
Planting a few mines, or even dummy ones, will prevent landings until after MCM operations have taken place. Without the means to provide a CAP, those few MiGs mean that the mines cannot be dealt with.
There has been an investment, over the last few years, and it is going on still, to improve the UK's amphibious capabilities. A new LPH, new LPDs, new RFA landing ships, new landing craft, Chinooks operating from aboard ship, etc etc etc. The whole thing is spoiled by the loss of protective air cover.
Sadly, the Army and RAF people I talk to lead me to conclude that trying to save money on protective systems and equipment, and relying on hoping for the best, is endemic in UK defence.