To expand in the above.
It does seem the military decision not to deploy a T-45 to the eastern Mediterranean was the correct one; the decision to subsequently deploy HMS Dragon post the attack on Akrotiri seems a political decision to allay Cypriot feelings which, unfortunately is obscuring the fact that’s it’s the wrong solution to the wrong problem.
The Ballistic Missile Threat to the Cyprus SBAs
The current ballistic missile threat to the SBAs in Cyprus lies in Iranian MRBMs of the types recently fired at the airbase at Incirlik in Turkey. These are medium range ballistic missile (MRBM) who performance in trajectory and speed means they are outside the engagement envelope of the current T-45 Sea Viper Aster 30 missile system. This shortcoming will only be addressed once they have received their SVE-1 upgrade around 2032*. The same equally holds true for the other European ships with systems based around Aster.
However, this threat is, as demonstrated by the interception of the MRBM aimed at Incirlik by the USN Arleigh-Burke AEGIS destroyers deployed in the eastern Mediterranean for the defence of their assets in Israel and Turkey and, presumably, also the long term U-2 deployment at Akrotiri.
The decision not to deploy a T-45 for missile defence of the SBAs would seem, therefore, to have been correct, the current deployment of HMS Dragon being purely for political reasons.
*
Future Carrier (Including Costs)
The Drone Threat to the SBAs
The attack last week on Akrotiri, which hit the hangar used by the US U-2 detachment, was performed by a late model Shahed drone using Russian components, such as the Kometa-B navigation system first seen in use in Ukraine last December. Indicating that Iran, and its allies such as Hezbollah in Lebanon, are using the latest generation of such drones hardened against EW. Whilst the Ukrainians are evolving their defences against such drones on an almost daily basis, the UK is not.
The initial C-UAS defence deployed to Akrotiri (not elsewhere such as Episkopi or Dhekelia) was the 34 Sqn RAF Regiment Protection C-UAS Wing with the ORCUS passive defence system - which would appear to have not been effective jamming a late generation drone. What is not obvious is if, and now since, the RAPIDsentry (with LMM missiles)** active defence system was deployed alongside it.
**
https://archive.is/20260306103608/ht...ones-x0zb52vz0
Iran
There are now a number of fixed and rotary wing assets deployed in the C-UAS role, (RAF F-35Bs, Greek and Turkish F-16s, RN Wildcat helicopters along with a single CrowsNest Merlin) along with the large number of Dutch, French, German and Italian frigates and destroyers and the imminent arrival of the CdG carrier and it’s Rafale wing.
All the above will be able to provide an air defence screen around Cyprus but at high cost in time and assets against cheap expendable drones, and where every missile expended will cost far more than the drone destroyed. It is also questionable as to whether they would be able to defence against a mass attack. Note that in Ukraine a single overnight attack can involve in excess of 500 such drones.
What is needed, if only as a back-stop last ditch defence around high value assets, is an effective interceptor drone system such as one of those recently offered by Ukraine to NATO - and rebuffed by the DoD.***
***
https://archive.is/20260310094455/ht...ti-drone-offer
The Gulf States and Saudi Arabia, rapidly exhausting their stocks of Patriot and other expensive missiles with replacement many years away, are now urgently negotiating to procure such systems.**** I would suggest that the UK should immediately sign an emergency UOR for the purchase of such systems not only for Cyprus but also HVAs in the UK.
It should be noted that such drones can as easily be launched from a commercial vessel at sea as well as from land.
****
https://kyivindependent.com/exclusiv...d-iran-threat/