Originally Posted by
ORAC
You have to question where they think they will find the qualified manpower to man the 13 new T26/T31they promise will be brought into service by 2035.
Not so many years ago they did manage to find enough people to keep something like seven of eleven (post 2021 review) frigates; and most of the destroyers, and an LPD, and both carriers, so where have all the sailors gone? I know that some of them are sent to warships under construction, but there has to be more things at play. Have the penny pinchers been cutting maintenance and spares to save a few quid? Unfortunately the situation facing the SSNs suggests that this is an issue, as the submarine service is not struggling with personnel retention as much as the surface flotilla.
Courting disaster for the sake of saving just small (in Government terns) sums. I wonder if questions have been asked in Parliament about frigate numbers suddenly falling of off a cliff?
Originally Posted by
Asturias56
NATO?? I thought it was in the process of being abolished?? We're supposed to stand on our own two feet.
And yes, this thread is full of historic posts saying that we'd never be able to man the carriers and also the rest of the navy. Some disagreed vehemently - and some even deny the issue now.
Some of disagreed as it was obviously not true. Back when Ben Wallace announced his review we had eleven frigates and managed to find personnel to put two thirds of them to sea or a readiness, and an LPD, and both carriers...
We are short of personnel, and when ships in build demand personnel they have to come from somewhere, and we can blame the idiot Cameron for reneging on and increase of 1500 personnel for the RN in 2015, after he made promises to back benchers about not cutting 'troop' (ie Army) numbers and he was unable to increase the overall number of people in uniform.
Some of us disagreed as it was not true, and because simple explanations rarely answer complex questions. T
here is also the small issue of the war at sea - surely nobody is suggesting that that would be easier to win (or deter) without the carrier? Just before the CSG25 deployment, an
article about the Royal Navy's forthcoming CSG25 deployment noted that:
The value of the UK Carrier strike group in protecting Europe is often underplayed. Not only is the carrier a declared NATO maritime command platform, but carriers would be employed to interdict Russian submarines and aircraft coming ‘around the corner’...
When did the RN Director of Public Relations stop producing content like this 1993(?) video? There is no talk of the jets being there to defend the carrier (only), or the ASW helicopters aboard the carrier being portrayed as being for self defence of the carrier and totally separate from the from the frigates and their ASW capabilities.
[4:40]
As well as intercepting other aircraft that may threaten the task group, Sea Harriers...
The dumbed down version would talk of intercepting aircraft that may threaten the carrier, as if the fighter is a self defence system like a point defence weapon aboard the ship, and that there are no other high value units that need to be defended.
[6:12]
Today the carrier is a sea control vessel, leading a task group and using her Sea Harriers to sanitise the sea for hundreds of miles around.
Not just the Sea Harriers, but the more important point is that both jets and helicopters defend at long range, far beyond that of ship launched weapons, providing a large area in which hostiles can be engaged.
[7:02]
The task group commander is launching the carrier's Airborne Early Warning Sea King helicopters. These increase the range of radar detection well beyond the horizon, and ensure that no unfriendly aircraft can get close to the task group without being discovered.
The point being that once detected they can be intercepted if you have nearby fighters, such as on CAP or on the carrier deck.
[7:40]
As part of the task group, a Type 23 frigate is carrying out its primary role of Anti Submarine Warfare which she conducts with her own radar, sonar, and communications systems, as well as her own Anti Submarine helicopter, working in conjunction with those from the carrier...
In other words the ASW helicopters aboard the carrier provide a capability for the task group as a whole, and that multiple helicopters are needed for continuous ASW protection.
[8:50]
In a task group, the characteristics of each ship's weapons and detection systems are used to the advantage of the whole force...
This film/video was made before the 'end of history' and the assumption that conventional capabilities were not needed, before the years of having a carrier in the Adriatic to support forces ashore and to protect NATO warships operating near a hostile coast, before many deployments to the Arabian Gulf when size limitations caused problems, and before the days of day of unwinnable land wars being seen as the focus of defence.
A few months ago a former carrier critic wrote this article:
Running on empty – how the Royal Navy nearly kept HMS Ark Royal into the 1980s
After the East of Suez withdrawal, Ark Royal
operated mainly in the Atlantic and Mediterranean,
carrying F-4 Phantoms, Buccaneers, Gannets and Sea Kings. She remained a potent platform, one of the few RN ships capable of nuclear strike with WE177 tactical weapons. Crucially, she fitted neatly into NATO war plans, able to defend herself [and her task group] against Soviet air attack while striking surface ships and submarines. By 1973, she was NATO’s sole non-US fixed-wing carrier, making her unique.
By 1978, however, the RN judged her too worn out to continue. Resources were shifting to the Invincible-class
‘through-deck cruisers’ for ASW helicopters and Sea Harriers. The gap between Ark’s
decommissioning, Hermes’
Sea Harrier refit, and Invincibles’
arrival would be covered by recommissioning HMS Bulwark
as a helicopter carrier.
SACLANT commander Admiral Kidd, however, was alarmed by the wider reduction in US Navy carrier forces assigned to his Command, which in wartime would play a vital role in getting military reinforcements across the Atlantic to Europe. In February 1978, he warned First Sea Lord Admiral Sir Terence Lewin that NATO faced a severe carrier shortage: “By the end of 1978… we need eight carrier task groups for reinforcement and resupply of Europe, and I shall be fortunate to have more than one, repeat one, American task group to cover the entire Atlantic and Norwegian Sea.” His blunt plea – “Terry, we need Ark Royal
” – forced the Admiralty to reconsider...
Enduring lessons
People are the critical constraint. The RN’s history since 1945 shows repeated failure to balance ships with crews. Ark
’s disposal was driven not just by money or condition, but by personnel shortages. Today, the Navy faces the same challenge: too few engineers and sailors to keep the fleet fully active.
Reserve fleets are costly illusions. Calls to keep old ships “just in case” ignore the reality that maintaining credibility for reactivation absorbs almost as many resources as keeping them in commission. By the time they are ready, the crisis has usually passed.
Royal Navy Carriers matter disproportionately. Admiral Kidd’s 1978 reminder of the unique value of RN carriers remains valid. Today, with the USN focused on China, NATO may again rely heavily on Britain’s Queen Elizabeth class to secure the Atlantic. Nearly fifty years after Ark Royal
paid off, Royal Navy strike carriers continue to provide NATO with capabilities far out of proportion to their number.
Previously posted here:
The Aircraft Carrier and Sea Control (carriers needed in the Atlantic and elsewhere for Air Defence and ASW - due to Maths/Physics/Geography)
As to the question of where I have been, most days I have felt like the Sly Stallone character in the film
Demolition Man when things appear so dystopic he says "Put me back in the freezer...".
Remember, seeking simple solutions to complex problems has just given us more complex problems!