That event is a long and complex story with many tentacles.
From the findings
https://www.faa.gov/sites/faa.gov/fi...7_findings.pdf
7. The first officer had a tendency to overreact to wake turbulence by taking unnecessary actions, including making excessive control inputs.
8. The American Airlines Advanced Aircraft Maneuvering Program ground school training encouraged pilots to use rudder to assist with roll control during recovery from upsets, including wake turbulence.
9. The American Airlines Advanced Aircraft Maneuvering Program excessive bank angle simulator exercise could have caused the first officer to have an unrealistic and exaggerated view of the effects of wake turbulence; erroneously associate wake turbulence encounters with the need for aggressive roll upset recovery techniques; and develop control strategies that would produce a much different, and potentially surprising and confusing, response if performed during flight.
10. Before the flight 587 accident, pilots were not being adequately trained on what effect rudder pedal inputs have on the Airbus A300-600 at high airspeeds and how the airplane’s rudder travel limiter system operates.
As for the Airbus FBW types....
https://safetyfirst.airbus.com/use-of-rudder/
https://safetyfirst.airbus.com/wake-vortices/
It seems that this "foot off" training is not just needed in the airliner world. Look at the data traces here
https://skybrary.aero/sites/default/...shelf/4040.pdf