Originally Posted by
Capn Bloggs
......... Re "normalised deviation", I'm not sure this applies here. Normalised deviation means deviating from published (perportedly safe) procedures, with no adverse consequences, so the deviations continue. In this case, it's pretty obvious that the "published procedures" were flawed in the first place.
Hiya
Capt B, true but I sort of see 2 related issues - (a) airspace design and (b) how things are conducted within that airspace.
If the airspace design had been used with positive control (ie holding traffic off R4 while 33 was in use or even holding R4 traffic at bridges or somewhere clear of 33 while it was in use) that would work.
Using that same airspace design with "see and avoid" was far less safe and, as reported, led to quite a few incidents of TA's before this fateful day.
But, as the "see and avoid" system was seen by the users at the coal face at least to work, despite the TA's, the operational use of the design became "normalised" to use "see and avoid".
Sadly, no-one (such as DCA management) seems to have studied the extra issues so this more dangerous way of using the design has became "normalised", particularly where ATC is busy.
That's just my take on it.
