Originally Posted by
Hot 'n' High
Who knows, you may be right. I think AA rocking up at DCA and stating that, as "policy", they'd never ever use the sidestep to 33 due to their own safety assessment flagging it up, esp if based on TCAS evidence, would have led to interesting discussions at senior levels. As you say, how that would have ended is anyone's guess.
Bit academic anyway as there was no AA ban and the AA flight accepted it when offered it and the next AA asked for it on initial contact ..... not realising what had just happened! That's why I had a $ sign in my earlier post! The cynic that I am........
About those discussions at senior levels . . . If your reference to such discussions was meant to include not only within a given airline, but also some or all of the cadres of senior officials in the industry, U.S. government, international colleagues, and think tanks - those are the same discussions which are supposed to be going on now, in light of the NTSB's pro-active responses to the accident. Although it is a limited sample, in the accidents in which Board processes have been involved in the time I have been trying to keep up via PPRuNe and other information sources, I can't recall a similar "urgent recommendation" addressed to FAA as NTSB issued in this matter. Safety Alerts to Operators (SAFO's) yes, such as after Air Canada "There's no one on 2-8-Right but you" 759 in San Francisco in 2017. But not the same as what has issued from NTSB now. Perhaps I missed some salient details but the review which FAA became instructed and/or motivated to conduct would have a total NAS scope.
Or maybe such a review will, regrettably, require an Act of Congress (it should not require this, but, you know, K Street, campaign donors, the seniority system, and the generally stellar academic and career experience required prior to election to the Congress . . . . too bad elected represenatives are not required to build hours first).