Originally Posted by
Biggus
A carrier is not an end in itself, it is merely a means to an end. It's a means of projecting air power. An on task carrier group, fully equipped, fully supported, is a useful, albeit very expensive, asset to have. But we don't have that.
We have two carriers, making availability uncertain. They also seem to have reliability issues - and please don't tell me they're teething troubles given how long they've been in the water.
They don't have an adequate air group. We don't have a credible AEW capacity. We are short of F-35s, and they are a joint, not RN only, asset (A debate I won't get into here). The F-35s we do have are no doubt double, triple or quadruple hatred, and as the primary air asset in a high threat environment, may be required elsewhere. Their V/STOL capability would also enable them to operate from remote LAND locations. We are short of ASW helicopter airframe, in terms of a carrier based ASW hunting group. Stripping training units to equip a carrier air group for a two week exercise is not the same as being able to run sustained combat operations.
We are short of frigates, destroyers and SSNs to protect the carrier itself - and don't tell me other NATO countries will provide them.
We are massively short of support units to keep a carrier group on station, replenishing fuel, ordnance, etc.
We seem to have adopted the approach of buying the carriers and then hoping we can find everything else needed to make them viable downstream.
So, while I'm not necessarily advocating scrapping the carriers, I do feel it's a discussion worth having. The current make do and mend situation is neither one thing or the other, and I don't think it's kidding (deterring) anyone.
There is a difference between not having something and having something on contract but being painfully slow about delivering it.
The "shortage" of F35s is a result of numerous factors, but is slowly being addressed (OCU outputting more aircrew, 809NAS standing up).
Won't argue about the AEW - although there is a difference between the effectiveness of Crowsnest against the requirement it was procured against and the somewhat esoteric "new" threats being postulated.
ASW frames - yep, concur.
Frigates, destroyers and support ships all under contract and in progress for new build or upgrade. It would be somewhat perverse to bin the lynchpin just as the rest comes to fruition. The naval requirement - as in what's its there for - is at least significantly clearer than the rationale for a large standing army.