"The problem with statistics of small numbers of events is that probabilities based on them have huge problems determining the confidence …"
Which is why the use of outcome - fatalities, as a measure of safety is of little value in a very safe industry.
Alternatively, risk based safety - reducing the level of risk of harm to an acceptable minimum, considers current activity. The process looks to the future based on what has happened, and what is happening now; neither measure absolute, but a useful a guide for judgement of an uncertain future.
The 737 Max recent history should not be overly projected forward because of the mitigations from modifications.
However, the continuing manufacturing issues involving several types, and the difficulties in providing a quick fix for culture, etc, suggest that there is an increased level of risk which may take time to reduce.
Furthermore, the regulator who should oversee these aspects has suffered similar problems.
Thus the current situation has to be judged relative to the excellent historical record of Boeing aircraft and the industry in general; better than most forms of transport.
Flying is 'safe', and flying in Boeing aircraft is sufficiently comparable with other aircraft not to be concerned relative to other transport activities.
The issue remains about who and how risk based judgements are made:- manufacturing governance, regulator oversight, and the context of presentation - media and personal, human bias.
http://john-adams.co.uk/wp-content/u...onsibility.pdf
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