TU.144 and WR6-3,
What I wrote is not a red herring and certainly does not absolve Boeing and the FAA from blame. All I was doing was pointing out that previous generations of pilots and airline training departments were well aware of, and used to dealing with, 1960s certificated aircraft and their deficiences. If you listen to what DPD had to say in the RAeS podcasts, the FAA was 'rather too lenient' in the application of its certification requirements for the 707, hence the changes DPD required for the rudder and the addition of a stick nudger.
Again, I think the FAA has had a rather too cosy arrangement with Boeing which, over the years, allowed Boeing to use grandfather rights for the 737. That, in itself, allowed later variants of the 737 to be built to less stringent requirements than would have been the case had it been a totally new type. But, so long as the training departments continued to apply training standards consistent with those earler requirements, safety was not significantly affected.
Come the Max, Boeing decided to correct for the longitudinal stability problems using the MCAS which operated on the whole stabilsier rather than a stick nudger operating on the elevators alone. Furthermore, allowing such a powerful control to be activated through inputs derived from a sole-source AoA sensor rather than having this duplicated or even triplicated, meant that there was now a gaping hole in the Swiss cheese. Thus, in no way, am I absolving Boeing and the FAA.
My comments regarding pilot proficiency concern the fact that, over time, flight operations departments may (probably?) have become less stringent regarding the awareness of, and training for, a runaway stabilser when compared with the way this was treated in the early days of the 707. I speak as an antique aviator and so am not aware of how much emphasis was placed on the runaway stabiliser drill on the 737Max.
And, WR6-3, I fully endorse your three likes above :-
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