Gentlemen, are You sure that this is not a red herring?
The issue with MCAS, as far as I can see it, is the following:
Slice 1:
It uses the most powerful control surface on the aircraft to force the nose down. On the accident aircraft (plural!), it was triggered not by multiple AOA vanes that all agreed about an approaching high AOA condition. The system was fired due to one single input from a quietly failed sensor without any checks, redundancy, whatever in place to keep it from happening. This was by design, not by a further system error. And unlike what has been written about the B707-400 above, it certainly introduced more than a tiny nose-down nudge.
Slice 2:
This protection system (for that is what it is, I consider it similar to the Airbus alpha protection in normal law in essence) has not been told about to the flight crews. It is said that this was due to cost cutting in training and intended to keep the Max under the same type rating as the previous models.
Slicee 3:
Self-certification, minimum authority supervision, ...
These are all cheese slices that had their holes lined up even before any crew set foot into the aircraft. Please take care not to bark up wrong trees.