Originally Posted by
PapaEchoIndia
Thanks for the reminder, didn’t check the links in fact
Kudos to the crew, windshear, hard landing, dual hyd failure, smoke and everyone on board is safe
Kudos??? You cannot be serious? That's an incompetent, grossly unprofessional (and on the company's part grossly dishonest) cluster****.
I can only conclude you didn't read the report's conclusions...d'uh oh indeed.
The airline only notified the Russian Interstate Aviation Committee on January 14, four days after the accident. Investigators believes that after the accident both the voice recorder (CVR) as well as the flight data recorder (FDR) were removed by RMS Technic in Antalya. The voice recorder was fitted to a second Airbus A321 (VP-BHN) flying the return service to Moscow. After arrival in Moscow, it was removed by another maintenance firm and transported back to RMS Technic in Antalya where the recorder was refitted to the original damaged A321, before the inquiry team arrived.
The investigation is ongoing.
Probable Cause:
Conclusion
The accident involving the AIRBUS A321-231 with registration VQ-BRS occurred in the early twilight hours, under visual meteorological conditions, as a result of erroneous actions by the Captain involving full backward movement of the control stick while attempting to correct deviations during the alignment phase (shallow flare), which involved establishing the aircraft's pitch attitude for landing at a significant altitude without reducing the vertical descent rate. This led to an intensive nose-up rotation, followed by a hard landing with the nose landing gear ahead of the main landing gear.
The most probable contributing factors are as follows:
- Delayed execution of the flight crew's procedure for going around (or a discontinued landing), as specified in the operational documentation (QRH, FCOM, FCTM), during instrument speed reduction significantly below the specified values and non-compliance of the current flight parameters with the stabilized approach criteria at altitudes lower than the stabilization height (1000 ft), including right before the alignment phase.
- The absence of stable skills in the Commander for executing the alignment procedure as outlined in the operational documentation, as well as the failure of the airline's instructor staff, including during the introduction program, to identify this factor.
- Insufficient theoretical knowledge of the Commander about the peculiarities of performing the approach and landing with a reduced level of automation (autopilot and autothrust disengaged), using the specified "MANAGED" speed mode and "GROUND SPEED MINI" function.
- Overestimation by the Commander of their professional skills and unwarranted reduction of the level of automation during the approach and landing phase under conditions of rapidly changing headwind component values with altitude.
- Lack of specific instructions in the airline's operational documentation regarding the possibility and conditions of reducing the level of automation for training of flight crew members undergoing the introduction program (approaches without AP and A/THR).
- Increased psychoemotional tension for the Commander during the final phase of the flight and, consequently, loss of situational awareness, resulting in dominance of glide path control without comprehensive evaluation of all flight parameters, primarily instrument speed.
- Imperfections in the preparation system related to human factors and crew resource management (CRM), as the Commander was unable to adequately assess the impact of automation disengagement on cognitive functions (perception, attention, memory, thinking), manage their emotions, and establish optimal crew interaction.
- Lack of a positive flight safety culture in the airline and, as a result, the low personal flight safety culture of the Commander, evident in:
* Creating an overly relaxed (non-professional) atmosphere during the flight and violating the principle of a sterile cockpit and cockpit and cabin crew interaction when performing the approach and landing.
* Prioritizing landing on the first attempt (at the expense of safe flight completion) and, consequently, failing to execute a timely go-around.
- Individual psychological characteristics of the pilots (for the Commander - excessive and unstable self-assessment, high need for dominance and recognition; for the First Officer - excitable and unstable response type with high activity and ambition, a strong need for dominance and self-assertion) that, in a stressful situation without adequate CRM, could hinder proper crew interaction.
The investigation revealed systemic shortcomings in identifying danger factors and controlling risk level, as well as the ineffectiveness of the flight safety management system within the airline, and the absence of control over the preparedness level of crew members from the management of the airline.