From the report:
The following factors may have contributed to the simultaneous inputs on the controls:
• the PM’s reflex action on the controls during the banked go-around, probably linked to
the deflection of the wheel and the unusual pitch attitude;
• failure to formalise the transfer of control;
• the absence of any warning about the effects of simultaneous actions on the controls in
the manufacturer's and operator's documentation for this type of aeroplane;
• the lack of information on the possibility of desynchronization of the controls in the event
of opposing inputs in the documentation available to pilots;
• a lack of knowledge about the systems resulting from this lack of information;
• the conviction that simultaneous inputs on the controls would be quickly perceived by
crews on this type of aeroplane.
The first two points pretty much sum it up IMO.
I'd argue that the simultaneous inputs were perceived almost instantly by both pilots, but due to the general level of arousal attributed to anomalous behaviour of the system rather than input from the other side. I would also point out that it’s fairly obvious when someone has their hands on the controls as they’re sitting next to you - I feel straight away when people use the yoke switches while I’m flying and they get asked to use the ones on the coaming or centre console.
Pretty thorough report, glad to see the 2-crew night Atlantic 24hr trip getting a bit of a spotlight. Try doing six of those a month for six months. Overall though, no surprises - decision making can be collaborative but manual flying is a solo operation pretty much all of the time.