Never really understood the term "Inadvertent IMC" Day VFR. It's fairly apparent looking out the window?
Maybe it should be "inadvertent lack of training / understanding"?
Measures taken -
- drafted a dedicated risk assessment addressing visual flight rules into IMC
- upgrading their fleet of EC130 and AS350 helicopters with the Garmin G500H primary flight display and multifunction display incorporating synthetic vision and a terrain alerting functionality
- modifying their AS350 helicopters with the Garmin GFC 600H helicopter flight control system (approved data for the EC130 was not available at the time of the investigation)
- acquired ICARUS (instrument conditions awareness recognition and understanding system) instrument flying training hoods
- introduced basic instrument flying training and inadvertent IMC recovery training
- updated their operator proficiency check syllabus to include knowledge and practical skills checks for avoiding and recovering from inadvertent IMC
- added the Helicopter Association International online academy ‘56 Seconds to Live’ inadvertent IMC avoidance course to their pilot training program
- introduced a pre-flight risk assessment tool
- introduced a company ‘Task rejection’ policy statement into their operations manual
- obtained an Airbus Helicopter Training Centre approval.
All that might do is make pilots "think" they can now randomly operate IMC?
Somehow I think the priorities are a little backwards.
Never really understood how the old NGT VFR rules were workable in Australia and look how that turned out.