Originally Posted by
Clinton McKenzie
It's always interesting when you – very unusually – make categorical statements, Mick. “Not a scintilla of evidence”? “Most assuredly not under any normal meaning”? It's not your style and I'm yet to work out the 'trigger'.
...
Clinton, if I happen upon a post that I think is mistaken, and if I have something factual to add, I am usually inclined to comment. When someone elects to double-down on something that is manifestly mistaken, that will routinely draw a somewhat more pointed response.
For better or for worse, I am afflicted with acquired afabulasia; that is, I am bull**** intolerant.
You have proposed a narrative for Captain Sullenberger's treatment by the NTSB that, if not based on the fictionalised account presented in the movie, is so similar as to be not discernibly different.
Regarding the Public Hearing, the
of Captain Sullenberger's testimony is available on YouTube, and the
transcript is available on the NTSB website; people can form their own views as to how the Captain was treated.
You seem concerned about the public nature of the hearing; that is a feature of the US system. If you have read Captain Sullenberger's book, Highest Duty, you might recall that the Captain, and his wife, accepted that from "within minutes of the world learning of Flight 1549", that they were now public figures. And the Captain resolved to use that position to advance aviation safety. (If you haven't read Highest Duty, that would be a good starting point before registering offence on the fellow's behalf.)
The NTSB public hearing, much like the earlier Congressional public hearing that Captain Sullenberger had attended (together with the presiding NTSB Chairman, no less), provided an opportunity for him with regard to advancing aviation safety. And that opportunity at the NTSB hearing was largely facilitated by the panel members' questions put to him. Questions such as:
DR. WILSON [NTSB]: Could you please describe what training you received at US Airways that you felt was most useful to helping you manage this event? ...
DR. WILSON: Looking back at the accident event, is there anything that you would do differently if you were faced with that situation again? ...
DR. WILSON: And one last question for you. Is there anything else that you would like to discuss today that we have not asked you so far? ...
CAPT. SICCHIO [US Airline Pilots Association]: Thank you for your testimony this morning. Just a couple of questions for you. Would you be kind enough to describe your background in CRM for us?
CAPT. SULLENBERGER: Yes. As I stated, I was selected to be among a couple of dozen pilots to be a course developer of our initial one-day introductory seminar. We helped implement that course and I was a facilitator for several years as we taught all our pilots the initial introductory phase. And then, in the follow-on Phase 2, where we did recurrent training in our annual classroom training, I was also a facilitator.
CAPT. SICCHIO: Thank you. And in fact, Captain Sullenberger, did you actually participate as a group that brought CRM to the airline in the very beginning?
CAPT. SULLENBERGER: Yes. I think I may have actually taught the very first CRM course in a beta mode in our training facility in San Diego in the late '80s. We adapted a course that was used by the U.S. Air Force within the Military Airlift Command ...
CAPT. SICCHIO: Great, thanks. So basically, you were in on the very ground floor development of CRM, ...
DR. KOLLY [NTSB]: You mentioned that you did not have any simulator training with regard to a forced water landing. Do you think such training would be beneficial?
CAPT. SULLENBERGER: Yes.
DR. KOLLY: And can you explain how? What, in the training, would you like to see, what do you think would help the situation? ...
CHAIRMAN SUMWALT [NTSB]: Captain Sullenberger, I've been at the Safety Board now almost three years and unfortunately, we don't usually have -- oftentimes don't have the flight crew to talk to. I appreciate your being here. Physically, I'm glad you're here so that we can ask questions.
CAPT. SULLENBERGER: Thank you.
CHAIRMAN SUMWALT: This event turned out differently than a lot of the situations the Board looks at. Tell me, in your mind, what made the critical difference in this event? How did this event turn out so well compared to, perhaps, other events that we see at the Safety Board? ...
CHAIRMAN SUMWALT: You testified to Congress -- you and I testified on the same day back in February, and you mentioned that the airline piloting profession faces some challenges. I want to make sure -- unfortunately, we, at the Board, we see events that don't have, oftentimes, good outcomes, so what can we extract from your mindset, from the things you've learned, to basically hand over to others in your profession? ...
CHAIRMAN SUMWALT: Thank you. In looking at the CVR transcript and listening, actually, to the CVR, I noticed that you immediately, after both engines were lost, you immediately turned on the ignition; you fairly much immediately started the APU and then commanded for the loss of both engines checklist. Oftentimes -- and we may even get some testimony on this later this morning or later today -- oftentimes, when somebody is faced with an unusual or surprising situation, there's a choke factor, there's a startle response. You did not seem to exhibit that startle response. It was like you knew, you were prepared for this, you knew immediately what to do. What do you attribute that to?
CAPT. SULLENBERGER: Well, if you think I wasn't startled, you misunderstand. But I think both Jeff Skiles and I have done this long enough and trained long enough to have internalized the values of our profession and to have learned what needs to be done, and so we quickly acknowledged our bodies' innate physiological reactions, set it aside and began to work on the task at hand.
CHAIRMAN SUMWALT: And I think that is so important. I'm trying to get an idea of what your mindset is and how you were there. I can contrast you to a crew that we looked at recently that I mentioned the captain said he was ambivalent. They had an engine fire 800 feet AGL and it took about three and a half minutes before they completed the checklist, which should be a memory item, should be done immediately. So I want to be able to bottle your mindset and be able to make sure that everybody is drinking from that same bottle.
This is not to say that all of questions put to Captain Sullenberger at the hearing were so accommodating. Ms Kolander (Association of Flight Attendants) clearly wanted to explore the adequacy of the capacity of the slide rafts for water evacuations. In that regard, she almost certainly had some legitimate safety points to make, however her handling of that was, at best, obtuse.
Notably though, the NTSB Chairman intervened to protect the Captain from Ms Kolander's line of questions.
I really don't have anything further to say on the matter. People can look at the evidence and form their own views.
Originally Posted by
Clinton McKenzie
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I’m sure the OP would appreciate it – as would I – if you applied your formidable intellect and research skills to answering the OP’s questions. Do you have a view on the answers?
Separately, regarding the question posed by the Thread Starter, if I had anything germane to offer, I certainly would have posted it.