Originally Posted by
grizzled
This was published yesterday in Nepal. It's from a document the investigative team sent to the regulator. The contents
seem to indicate that the panel have already gleaned some initial info from the CVR and FDR, as well as perhaps from training records, maintenance records and crew duty records. Make of it what you will. Certainly some of the recommendations are problematic for Nepal.
Item (1) & (2) Fairly standard stuff, avoiding split @rse turns onto final. Full IFR procedures with no visual approaches.
Item (3) Who will examine the TREs? A non company examiner would increase confidence. Regulator involvement.
Items (4) & (5) are very revealing. It would be interesting to know what ‘augmented’ element had been approved. What risk assessments had been carried out & the pressure applied to the regulator to approve it?
Item (5) : I assume this means the same flight crew, alternating PF & PM, for an eight sector day not exceeding 8 hour flight duty period?
Clearly tightening up, attempting to mitigate the known Threats/Errors.
The FDR/CVR will be rich in CRM training material for others to learn from this tragic accident