Referring to the report, “Bayesian Methods in the Search for MH370”(Fig 4.3), it predicts that the speed observed on primary radar from Penang to the last primary radar point at 1822:12, will equate to the aircraft being too far west of the 1825:27 BTO arc (satellite data).
Using THEIR thinking, then the only way around this is to disregard the 1825:27 BTO arc and use the 1828:06 BTO arc i.e. continue northwest along N571 to an arbitrary point 25 NM north west of NILAM. It also requires human intervention to repower the SATCOM. Then at the 1828 position, the aircraft would need to turn south to meet the remaining BTO/BFO data. Thus, to reach the 1941:03 BTO arc, it is still travelling at cruise speed. This leads to an endpoint around 38S 88E, but has the problem of not enough fuel on board to do that, and a search area that has been extensively searched to no avail.
But if we look at the diversion to Banda Aceh via NILAM-SANOB with an inoperative left HGA and left Autothrottle, then at the slow down at TOPD to Banda Aceh, the aircraft will NOT overshoot the 1825:27 BTO arc. The primary radar and satellite data are then correct. No human intervention is required (crew deceased), since the switch to the right HGA completes the log on. The BTO and turn at 1828:06 is also correct, since the aircraft is turning left at SANOB to Banda Aceh, or possibly ANSAX. Note, if it is ANSAX, then the ANSAX 2C arrival and ILS RWY 17 has NOT been loaded, as this would not match BTO data, and the recorded easterly wind over Banda Aceh is slightly in error.
The aircraft overflies Banda Aceh airport, reverts to magnetic heading, and continues south. Note, the recordings from the Indonesian radars at Lhokseumawe and Sabang are not available. The flightpath south meets all BTO/BFO data and crashes near the seventh arc, most likely inside the seventh arc at 34S 93E. It matches the fuel exhaustion point precisely. This site remains unsearched to the 40 nautical mile allowance.