Originally Posted by
framer
Tom Sawyer
That shouldn’t happen. If Engineers are making a conscious decision to do this then they don’t understand how fallible their minds are. Distraction is probably the greatest threat but their are others. If any Engineers are reading this I hope you’re disturbed by the idea of signing them off as removed prior to removing them. I’m pretty sure most of you would not contemplate it.
Framer, I totally agree that this should not happen but these are positions we are put into. I have cited two examples of where we sign for items as part of the Transit Check, but they are not carried out until after close up/pushback and the check has already been certified in the Tech Log for practical reasons, so straight up it is happening and accepted by Crew, Engineers, QA and the CAMO, and the Authority. Taking the by-pass pin a stage further, it is not that unusual these days to have a ground handler doing a push back and pulling the pin for display to crew........yet it is the Engineer who has taken responsibility prior to the event as part of the check. We may not even be there for push back - I worked for one international carrier where this was exactly the case.
Now pitot covers are a different level in flight safety terms and we know what the procedure should be. Flipping this around a bit for sake of argument; Engineer does the procedure correctly and removes covers, verifies and signs for the job after completion at say 15-20 mins before departure, so maybe 30 mins plus before take off, barring any issues. Aircraft departs and gets airborne with a ASI fault as per the first in the series of three, the EY aircraft, and is found to have mud wasp nest blocking pitot tube. Subsequent inquiry finds pitot covers removed too early. Where do we go from there? Is it deemed acceptable risk, and on what basis, after all, we don't really know how many ASI incidents have been averted by the fitting of pitot covers in BNE. At the moment the data from incidents is mud wasps 1, pitot covers 2 so not conclusive. We can't control mud wasp nest building, but we can control pitot covers but they come with an inherent safety risk that needs controls and management, which may include accepting signing for the job before carrying out the task as per steering by-pass pin which is controlled by showing the pin. For that matter covers could be shown to the crew through the DV window as they are removed immediately prior to push when the person is on the steps (if you can find any).
I'm not advocating that the Engineer did nothing wrong. I'm not advocating this approach to all Engineering tasks. I'm trying to apply some real world reality to the situation that reduces the risks from both aspects. We can't Eliminate the risk (Mud wasps). We can't Engineer the risk out (pitot tubes). So we are left with Manage, which is down to fallible humans. I don't think the lessons from the MH incident have been learnt. More robust and active "Manage" measures are required from both Engineering and Flight Crew, and recognition that we do not operate in a perfect, controlled world but one that where one "solution" could impact another causing another issue.