Pitot Covers Brisbane Take 2
Thread Starter
Pitot Covers Brisbane Take 2
There are no words…
Perhaps we need big fluro flashing signs at the stand or something?
If it was night, they would have departed clearly. Then the fun really starts.
Perhaps we need big fluro flashing signs at the stand or something?
If it was night, they would have departed clearly. Then the fun really starts.
An Australian Transport Safety Bureau investigation preliminary report has detailed that an Airbus A350 passenger aircraft was about to be pushed back for departure from Brisbane Airport before it was observed that covers were still in place on its pitot probes.
https://www.atsb.gov.au/media/news-i...-probe-covers/
https://www.atsb.gov.au/media/news-i...-probe-covers/
Last edited by PoppaJo; 19th Aug 2022 at 02:15.
As part of its investigation, to date the ATSB has interviewed the LAME, AME and the refueller, and reviewed airport security video, which did not show that the required final walk-around of the aircraft was conducted by either the LAME or the AME prior to dispatch.
Join Date: Aug 2009
Location: Australia
Posts: 509
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
How did the crew pre-flight walk around fail to see this... I assume without any data inputs this would have likely resulted in a rejected take-off due to lack of airspeed data? Or could they have still departed with loss of control risk?
How did the crew pre-flight walk around fail to see this
Because the FO did a walk around of an A350 in less than 2 minutes.
Join Date: Dec 2014
Location: Australia
Posts: 36
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Have mud wasps ever actually built a nest quickly in any pitot tubes at Brisbane airport? Because if not, I feel this policy about putting on pitot covers during turns is an example of overregulation that actually reduces safety outcomes.
Originally Posted by ThunderstormFactory
Have mud wasps ever actually built a nest quickly in any pitot tubes at Brisbane airport? Because if not, I feel this policy about putting on pitot covers during turns is an example of overregulation that actually reduces safety outcomes.
https://www.atsb.gov.au/publications.../final-report/
In 2006 it was only 55 minutes turnaround https://www.atsb.gov.au/publications...601453_001.pdf
Was suggested on previous post that covers self destruct at a certain speed but idea shot down . Maybe a big orange sign across windshield ? Maybe red streamer across thrust levers that’s kept with covers . Only thing that’s certain it will happen again .
Originally Posted by T Vasis
How did the crew pre-flight walk around fail to see this...
The captain looked up at and likely observed the fitted pitot covers, however they were required to be fitted at that time as per the operator’s policy
At 0904 the LAME re-entered the flight deck, certified for the transit check in the technical log, cleared the technical log entry for the fitment of the pitot covers, and removed the pitot cover warning placard from the flight deck pedestal.
”Between 0852:18 and 0854:03, the first officer conducted a preflight walk-around”.
Because the FO did a walk around of an A350 in less than 2 minutes.
Because the FO did a walk around of an A350 in less than 2 minutes.
Thread Starter
Originally Posted by T-Vasis
How did the crew pre-flight walk around fail to see this... I assume without any data inputs this would have likely resulted in a rejected take-off due to lack of airspeed data? Or could they have still departed with loss of control risk?
Airspeed alive goes back the Cessna 172. Airbus no different.
Between 0852:18 and 0854:03, the first officer conducted a preflight walk-around. The walk- around was truncated from the nose, to the right engine, across to the left engine and back to the airbridge. The aircraft operator’s procedures also required the extremities of the wings, airframe, and tail section to be inspected, however this was not carried out.
Have mud wasps ever actually built a nest quickly in any pitot tubes at Brisbane airport?
How did the crew pre-flight walk around fail to see this..
In a perfect world, we’d be doing the exterior inspection with the jet completely ready to go flying, but that’s rarely how it works, The cargo doors are still open, they’re still refuelling, the NWS lockout pin’s in, the engineer’s headset’s plugged in, etc etc etc. We have to rely on having robust mitigators instead. Having the probe covers still on is much the same. Not ideal, but better than the alternative.
Originally Posted by Ken Borough
Does this failure amount to negligence? And does the FO still have a job at SQ?
Pitot covers are meant to stay on until several minutes before pushback, whereas the flight crew walk around usually happens 20-30 minutes before ETD. The SOPs dictated pitot covers would have been on during the flight crew’s walk around.
The mitigation the flight crew had in this case was a warning placard placed on the centre pedestal by the engineer which was only to be removed once they had removed the covers, except in this case they removed the placard without taking the covers off or conducting a final walk around before pushback.
The pilots were following SOP and trusted the engineering to comply with their SOPs.
I know some pilots have a habit of opening the windows, leaning out and physically checking to see the pitot tubes are uncovered in a situation like this, however probably impossible to see from the flight deck of an A350.
Does this failure amount to negligence? And does the FO still have a job at SQ?
Personally I would like to view them before doing any start procedures.
Ken will hopefully apologise for the inferences which could reasonably be drawn from his questions.
In any event, it’s an odd order of pre-flight inspections (though I understand the justification for it). If there’s stuff left to do which the crew cannot practicably confirm, by first-hand observation before taxiing, it’s little wonder this kind of problem arises.
In any event, it’s an odd order of pre-flight inspections (though I understand the justification for it). If there’s stuff left to do which the crew cannot practicably confirm, by first-hand observation before taxiing, it’s little wonder this kind of problem arises.
Probably handy to keep Ken's questions in context. He prefaced his questions with a direct quote from the investigation report, specifically,
Regardless of whether the pitot covers should have still been in place when the FO conducted the preflight walk-around, it is fairly clear that said walk around was manifestly deficient and failed to comply with SQ procedures. Technically it doesn't meet the legal standard for negligence but it was clearly a breach of duty.
I wouldn't expect someone to be sacked for that but neither would I expect there to be no action at all.
Between 0852:18 and 0854:03, the first officer conducted a preflight walk-around. The walk-around was truncated from the nose, to the right engine, across to the left engine and back to the airbridge. The aircraft operator’s procedures also required the extremities of the wings, airframe, and tail section to be inspected, however this was not carried out.
I wouldn't expect someone to be sacked for that but neither would I expect there to be no action at all.
As usual (with rare exceptions) a valid point, Mick.
My apologies to Ken if his implied call for the FO’s head was based on the pitot covers remaining on rather than the ‘truncated’ walk-around.
My apologies to Ken if his implied call for the FO’s head was based on the pitot covers remaining on rather than the ‘truncated’ walk-around.
Originally Posted by Cilba
At the airline I worked for it was required that the captain and the first officer viewed the gear pins and covers- three of each- before they were stowed in their dedicated stowage.
