The adverse human view continues, ‘aircrew’, … ‘error’ - a definition after the fact.
Similarly human activities, ‘monitor’, ‘blindly following’, ‘continuing to maintain’, describe what is assumed to have occurred, but for which we have insufficient knowledge about the crews were thinking, nor their reasoning of the choice of activity / inactivity.
The important question is if it is reasonable to expect crews to manage these situations, considering the nature or rarity of the anomaly, the operational pressures, and crew’s training and experience.
40 yrs ago safety was defined by outcome, body count. Nowadays, still based on outcome, much safer, but we fret over mistaken button pushes, the finesse of flight control and judgement calls, in very safe but vastly more complicated aircraft flown in complex situations.
This incident had a safe outcome; how was that accomplished, compare that activity with the vast number of normal operations. Then and only then consider the specific activities which we judge adverse, what is assumed, taken for granted.
The investigation into this event could help with these questions, but even so, our biased selves with hindsight will conclude what ever we wish; what we choose to learn.