For those who've forgotten or are not too familiar with what happened on MAX accident flights and preceding Lion Air flight there’s a good summary at
https://www.ntsb.gov/investigations/...ts/asr1901.pdf
For those who think they could have handled MCAS malfunction, the report also delves into Boeing’s inadequate compliance with FAR 25.1309 hazard assessment, including:
“16 While Boeing considered the possibility of uncommanded MCAS operation as part of its functional hazard assessment, it did not evaluate all the potential alerts and indications that could accompany a failure that also resulted in uncommanded MCAS operation. Therefore, neither Boeing’s system safety assessment nor its simulator tests evaluated how the combined effect of alerts and indications might impact pilots’ recognition of which procedure(s) to prioritize in responding to an unintended MCAS operation caused by an erroneous AOA input.”
EASA was rather more scathing of Boeing’s processes, assumptions and documentation in its Return to Service report