Yes, it's very important to give the flight crew the benefit of the doubt here, on performance in what appeared to be challenging weather conditions. But that said, this entire BA1307 A321 EGLL/LHR landing instability event thread appears to be missing critical assessment of key points related to FBW flight control design. Any credible assessment of this kind of an event needs to consider APC/PIO, and any potential contributing factors, regarding elements "Air-Ground Sensing" logic and state changes, flight control logic changes as a function of RA and A-G sensing, potential effects of multiple RA inputs as a function of bank angle, FBW algorithm phase margins, gain margins, and damping ratios, in both roll and pitch, possible issues of multiple side stick inputs, main gear strut extension and compressions, pitch changes due to thrust inputs or engine response, FBW pitch and bank limiting interactions, and still a host of other factors like the wind and gust environment, including the power spectral density of any gusts. Finally, DFDR and QAR data would be important to really assess how much of this event was potentially related or attributed to flight control design, versus pilot inputs, versus external disturbance effects. Do not assume this response would necessarily be the same with other types or other OEMs jets. Gusting to 31 knots, with this response? This type of an event outcome is arguably much less likely in other jet types, or other OEMs jets, due very different flight control designs, both FBW and non-FBW. I can confidently make that assertion, having previously flown many of these types in specific tests, for determination or assessment of both AFM and operational (FCOM) limiting or demonstrated conditions, over many decades.