The French tantrums over a legitimate exit from a basket case contract cannot be all there is to this saga. It has been apparent for a number of years the French were not delivering on offsets and work for local companies. As well, the final capability was questionable and loaded with more and more risks, with a project blow-out from 50 billion to 90 billion AUD, which was always going to be terminal once our Allies onside with nuclear propulsion. Below is an excerpt from today's newspaper The Australian.
"Mr Hamilton-Smith said the deal with the French started with a commitment to 90 per cent of the work being done locally, which dropped to 80, then 70 and “after quite a scuffle” to 60 per cent."
While the French outbursts are complex, and you can look no further than within this thread, I'd invite those interested to spend an evening on deep and very researchable historical information of the French in the South Pacific ( you'll nee a lot longer if looking at Indo-China ). 1939 onwards is probably most relevant in getting an appreciation of what weight to place on French policy in the region moving forward.
Australia is facing a deteriorating security situation and whilst cooperation with France is important in the Pacific, the reliability of such a relationship to extend toward a coherent mutual defence of interests would be a folly now as much as it was with the Japanese steamrolling through the region in the early 1940's. In this century, a strategic investment with the French would always be at the mercy of a better deal for that European nation with the Chinese Communist Party.
A well equipped Australian military, with a committed UK and US in the region, will probably well suit the French eventually. It will allow for fence sitting and minor defence commitments to the South Pacifc whilst others are left to challenge a rising China ( in whatever form that may take ).