I can only describe what happens(ed) at LHR and up until the data is recieved by the pilots.
Projected pax loads are 'in the system' about 24hrs prior to departure, this gave us the available cargo volume (hold space). About 4 hours prior to dep', we were given the approximate cargo/mail/cou weight and we could then calculate an estimated ZFW. The flight plans were generated by QF ops LHR based on the projected load data and we recieved the nominal fuel uplift about -2hrs at the latest. The operating crew could then increase that amount if required, but usually, every flight was full. I'd say more than half the flights ex-LHR were within 1000kg of MTOW, while about 5-10% were 'redispatch', were loads were so high as to prohibit the ideal fuel uplift. In these cases, the crew would have to make a decision for a fuel stop at some point. Most redispatched flights made it with sufficient reserves, but I've known a few that had to make an extra stop.
We were required to 'practice' a manual load and trimsheet once a month to stay proficient, but always using the system as a back-up to ensure accuracy. However, as I mentioned before, most wgt/bal mistakes are made while inputting data, so it makes little difference whether the loadsheet is system or manually generated. There is of course greater chance of error in the subsequent calculation on the manual, but any cargo/baggage container that is given an incorrect weight, will produce an incorrect CG and therefore stab setting. Really not such a big deal with modern aircraft, considering that notional/actual weight differences in baggage and especially passengers can conspire to make big differences, and the fact that CG limits should (and do
AFAIK) take such anomalies ino account. Being seriously out of CG limits will only bite you when other events conspire to expose it, such as loss of an engine during climb, fuel system mis-management, etc.
Back to the procedure;
About 1.5 - 2 hrs prior to dep, we would get the actual and final cargo/mail/cou figures where we would then be able to finalise our hold loadplan. Using the checked in pax loads and location at that point, we would be able to say with some confidence where the CG would be, but until checkin closed, there was always the chance of a last minute hold change.
The interesting part is that with manual wgt/bal, the trim sheets use 5 pax cabin bays and 5 cargo hold areas as the basic locations (or moment arms) to calculate CG location (For the 747). The system does the same until the flight closes at check in. At this point, each seat row is given its own CG effect, so if you had a lot of pax sat in the front of any given bay, the CG would jump forward when the check in closed and the system went from 'estimates' to 'actuals'. I believe there are a number of wgt/bal systems that do this, but certainly not all. If the movement of CG was bad enough, we would have to relocate stuff in the holds, or even chop some stuff to get the CG within limits. Again, since most of our SQs were full, there would be little change when the wgt/bal system went active at check in closure (usually 30 mins before dep.
Another point with the manual load and trim sheet procedure, is that the MTOW is reduced by 2000kgs to accomadate the relative innacuracy of the calcualations and higher probability of error. This was really to widen the trim limits at these weights, which become very tight in the last 5000kgs. So MTOW using system would be 396,625kg while using the manual would be 394,625kg.
Based on the report, it would be safe to assume that their loadsheet and trim was system calculated.
We often had FOB figures of over 160,000kgs for these flights so we would rarely reach the MZFW of 244,939kg, which usually meant fuel in the stab which further reduced the trim limits (a specifically defined area on the trim chart). It is my understanding that the 744 will transfer the stab fuel into the centre tank once that equivelant amount of fuel has been burned from the centre. This momentary and severe CG change is accomadated by the TO trim being no further forward than 21% MAC. Since this aircraft had only a small quantity in the centre tank, I seriously doubt that it carried any stab fuel, nor was it close to MTOW. I would therefore estimate the CG limits as being between 11.5%mac and 31.0% mac. At MTOW, these limits can tighten up to 21.5%mac and 23.2% mac.
I will reiterate the point that experience on type and especially familiarity with the typical loads would/should have redflagged the figures being loaded into the FMS. Adherence to proper procedures by all 3 flight crew would almost certainly have identified the error.
Another interesting factor is that by using the Derate 2 procedure, would require an additional stab adjustment which for their weight assumption would have been + 0.66 on the stab. Not much I know, but at the weight and speed they were actually rotating at, there is the possibility that such a stab adjustment could have 'encouraged' the nose to pitch up, though I would say that the pitch tendancies in the respect would be more ascociated with the amount of thrust being generated.
Finally, the reason for such a long post and so much ancillary information is that some errors CAN be spotted by an observant crew that faithfully adhere to procedure, but there are many wgt/bal errors that will be totally invisible to even the most experienced and intuitive of flight crews. While I accept that modern aircraft are much more tolerant of CG and trim errors, my concern lies with the declining standards of training and experience, especially centralised load planning, that seems to spreading throughout the industry. I know in this case the wgt/bal calculation was not an issue, but with examples of crew errors such as this one, and in mind of all the others that I have seen in my time, is anyone else as concerned as I am about the increasing possibility that such 'simple' errors could become more common and harder to spot? I would like to see the industry return to dedicated load controllers that get at least 3 months training with the appropriate authority rather than the poor sods from checkin that get as little as 2 weeks training before they are let loose on big jets without supervision. What I see now are apes that can mimmick the procedure of wgt/bal but they do not have the experience or ability to spot errors before they reach the flightdeck.