TukwillaFlyboy
Afraid I don't have much to add. Most of what I know of the specifics is from reading the Seattle Times - just like the rest of you. In particular, I know absolutely nothing more about the "pitch upset" during flight test aside from what's in the linked article.
A few somewhat generic comments - getting TIA is always a somewhat contentious process, with the FAA/EASA wanting more and more data and the airframer wanting it granted so they can get on with cert testing. I always found it interesting that - before TIA was granted - the FAA had absolutely no problem with the aircraft flying around with a dozen or more Boeing employees on board doing/observing testing - but insisted it was far to dangerous for an FAA employee to come along and get actual first hand information regarding whatever the issue was.
I
did have first hand experience with the Boeing "Regulatory Authority" - RA - and I often considered it borderline incompetent. There were some good people in the RA, but for the most part it was made up of mindless bureaucrats who only knew processes, not the product. Worse, the RA put specific rules in place to prevent free and open communication between the Boeing engineers (ARs - Authorized Representatives - the delegated equivalent of a DER) and the FAA. They actually prohibited the ARs from 'cold calling' the FAA - if we got a call from the FAA we could respond to it, but we couldn't simply call the FAA with an issue or question. As a result, stuff that I could have straightened out with a 10 minute phone call to my counterpart at the FAA instead turned into a week or more process of working the issue through the RA bureaucracy.
The FAA side made it even worse - as a DER there were several FAA specialists that I'd worked with regularly. We knew, trusted, and respected each other and could have open and honest dialog. When Boeing went the delegated route, the FAA moved all those people I'd worked with out of the cert process and created a new group - staffed by new people - to interface with Boeing cert. So all those years of knowledge and trust was thrown away. Worse, the last ten years turned into a brain drain on both sides - as the Boeing and FAA experts from my generation retired, they were largely replaced with young, relatively inexperienced engineers that didn't know how to focus on the important aspects. One FAA specialist in particular (often quoted in coverage of the MAX fiasco) I had major issues with - this person only knew when to check the box that something had been done - not that it had been done well or correctly, or if the conclusions were valid, only that it had been done and they could check that box.
