Oh my.. Got lucky when luck wasn’t needed; just better decision-making and robust procedures. Simply astounding that a second approach was attempted after the first was so badly managed; and that one was also then badly managed.
The decision to fly manually seems suggestive of a lack of familiarity and confidence in using the automatics. With less than 500 on type and few hours on-type in the period pre-incident, versatility and confidence in using the AFCS to full advantage may have been lacking. This was also accepted by the more experienced pilot on type, who was also a commander. Given the seniority in the company of the commander on the day, it is hard to escape the impression that the P2 went along with a lot more that they should have. In fairness, irrespective of culture and hierarchy, SOPs on challenge and intervention are often not very comprehensive, specifying a very narrow set of deviation parameters, which offer little help for a broader set of circumstances which can be implicitly dangerous and need action. The flight read anything but safe and well-judged.
Glad all came out of it safely and provided us with things to learn from.